Ladies and
Gentlemen,
Let me start by saying that it is a real pleasure to be here with you
today. Missile defence is a subject
that few Secretaries General of NATO have ever had to address. I have a certain feeling that this is
about to change – because in the 21st century, the importance of
missile defence, and its relevance to the NATO Alliance, is bound to grow.
In the Cold War, when huge nuclear arsenals were facing each other,
missile defence was, quite literally, on the defensive: the sheer number of offensive forces
could overwhelm any defence system, no matter how sophisticated. Undoubtedly, the superpowers made
considerable efforts in missile defence research and development – the
Soviet
Union as you
might remember even deployed a system around Moscow.
And even after the ABM Treaty was signed, there was a need to keep
abreast of relevant technologies, in order to avoid nasty surprises. But then the odds were not in favour of
missile defence. That concept
remained in the shadow of the East-West military competition.
Today, the strategic
landscape has changed, and so has the context for missile defence. Clearly, scenarios of mutually assured
destruction need no longer concern us – and we should all be thankful for
that. Yet the new security
environment confronts us with a number of quite different challenges that have
led to a reappraisal of missile defence.
So what are the challenges
that account for this reappraisal?
First, the evolution of the
threat. I am not going to make a
detailed threat analysis – this is an exercise that NATO Allies are currently
engaged in. All I want to say here
is that North
Korea’s nuclear test last year, there were some shades of
positive news this morning and Iran’s ongoing nuclear programme send a clear
message about the ambitions of these countries. So do their increasingly ambitious
ballistic missile development and testing programmes, not to speak about 3000
centrifuges.
North
Korea may be far away from NATO’s European perimeter, but
it is not that far away from our two North American Allies.
Iran, on the other hand, is much closer. And it is situated in a place from where
it can challenge many Allied interests.
Second, there is also a
serious concern that the nuclear ambitions of certain countries could lead to a
“domino effect” in their respective regions. Again,
Iran and
North
Korea are two critical cases. If they become fully-fledged nuclear
powers, other nations in the Middle East and Asia might feel compelled to follow. As a result, nuclear proliferation might
accelerate substantially. We could
find ourselves in a situation with more fingers on more triggers – and not all
of them may belong to rational individuals.
This brings me to my third
point: the limits of
deterrence. The attacks of “9/11”
have reminded us of the emergence of a new breed of terrorism, bent on
inflicting mass casualties. True,
these attacks were not carried out by a state, but by what we call non-state
actors. They did not fire any
missiles, but used hijacked civilian airliners as weapons of mass
destruction. Nevertheless, these
and other attacks demonstrated that our traditional concepts of rationality,
self-restraint, and mutual deterrence may not always work the way we want them
to. Perhaps states are less prone
to suicidal behaviour than the likes of Al Qaeda, but I wouldn’t want to bet on
it. In a nutshell, we increasingly
realise that deterrence alone is insufficient: it needs to be augmented by
defence.
Another factor that has
contributed to the reappraisal of missile defence is the emergence of a private
market for WMD components and know how.
The smuggling network of A. Q. Khan, who supplied several nations with
blueprints and components for nuclear weapons and missiles, has dealt a heavy
blow to international non-proliferation.
This “WMD black market” has further eroded the logic that proliferation
and non-proliferation are essentially matters between states and
governments. It is now also a
matter of “private entrepreneurs”.
Finally, many of these new
developments are exacerbated by the proliferation of ballistic missile
technology. Here, too, patterns are
changing. In the past, a customer
would buy a fully-fledged missile system from the seller. Today, however, several nations are
cooperating on the development, production and testing of missiles. This reduces testing needs,
international visibility, and costs.
As a result, the spread of WMD is accompanied by a parallel spread of
delivery means. In 1972, when the
ABM Treaty was signed, 9 countries possessed ballistic missiles. Today, that number has almost
tripled.
What does this all mean for the NATO Alliance? Clearly, if the transatlantic community
wants to prevail in this new strategic landscape, we must rethink the
fundamentals of our political and military strategies. And this rethinking is indeed well under
way. NATO has moved beyond the Cold
War paradigm of “I exist, therefore I deter”. Over the past few years, the
Alliance has adopted a much more active approach
to security. Today, NATO is engaged
in operations and missions in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and, of course, Central Asia. We are
engaged in combat, peacekeeping, training and education, logistics support, and
humanitarian relief. For all these
operations and missions, the Cold War no longer serves as a point of
reference. They are impressive
demonstrations of an Alliance adapting to a radically new security
environment.
I firmly believe that this
ongoing adaptation of our Alliance would remain incomplete if it did not
also include a fresh look at missile defence. And I am happy to say, we have made some
headway here as well. For quite
some time now, Allies have been discussing how best to protect deployed forces,
population centres and territory of NATO member states from ballistic missiles,
including those that could carry chemical, biological or nuclear warheads. At the NATO Prague Summit in 2002 we
launched the Missile Defence Feasibility Study, in order to examine defence
options against the full range of missile threats. And we have launched a programme for the
development, by 2010, of a capability to protect our deployed troops against
short and medium range ballistic missiles.
In other words, NATO has been moving and is moving in the right
direction.
But you and I know that is
not the entire story. Just look at
the current public debate on the US national missile defence system and its
so called Third Site in Europe. To me,
that debate shows that much of the current thinking about missile defence is
still constrained by ideology and by excessive Cold War baggage. Whether in our own member countries or
in Russia: too many people are still quick to
dismiss missile defence as technically infeasible, militarily destabilising, and
economically wasteful. Indeed, I
can hardly think of any other issue in modern strategic thinking where Cold War
dogmas are as persistent as in the area of missile defence.
I will say a bit more about
Russia in a moment. But it is not just with a view towards
Russia when I say that we have to move the
debate to a more rational level. We
simply cannot afford to approach our defence requirements of today and tomorrow
with the mindset and terminology of yesterday. After all, missile defence goes to the
heart of NATO’s collective defence obligation. It goes to the heart of Atlantic
solidarity.
For this reason, we need a new approach to missile defence – an approach
that combines national views and security needs with those of the Alliance at
large; an approach that draws the right political and technical conclusions from
the increasing ballistic missile threat – and which sets out a clear, agreed
course of action to take.
What are the main elements of
such an approach? Let me highlight
what I believe should be the key points.
My first point is one of
principle. In our
Alliance, security is indivisible. And that is why, when it comes to
missile defence, there simply cannot be an “A-league” and a “B-league” within
NATO. I am not suggesting that all
Allies must now acquire identical military capabilities. In an Alliance of 26 countries, that is an
illusion. But what the principle of
“indivisible security” does suggest is that individual plans or
initiatives of one or several Allies should be complementary with the collective
security requirements of the entire Alliance.
There is a clear desire among Allies to see the proposed
US missile defence system and NATO’s own
programme evolve in such a complementary way. I believe that this is a sensible
principle – and that we will follow it as we move ahead.
My second point: we need to
continue our discussions and consultations among Allies. NATO Allies have been discussing missile
defence for quite some time, but the proposed
US system with its Third Site in
Europe is a rather recent development. So we need to absorb the full
implications of this project for NATO. Put another way, we need to look at which
NATO countries would be protected?
Which would not? What would
be our NATO options to provide coverage for those Allies not under the
US umbrella? And, most importantly, how can NATO’s
current and planned missile defence system be “bolted on” to the
US system?
We have had a number of
detailed discussions at senior political levels, including several meetings of
the North Atlantic Council, with senior political and defence advisors from
capitals. General Obering and
Assistant Secretary Rood have been regular guests at NATO and they will be, in
my opinion, in the future. NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers have also had
useful discussions on this issue in recent months. We need to continue that dialogue among
Allies, and to further deepen it.
My third point: we must
continue our discussions with Russia.
Let me be blunt.
Russia’s harsh criticism of the
US plans has given the debate a NATO-Russia
angle that I consider unproductive and unhelpful. We have been subjected to some very loud
Russian rhetoric – including warnings to our Czech and Polish Allies that should
have no place in today’s Europe. All
this is distracting us from the key question – how to safeguard our security in
an age of missile proliferation. And this is a question that poses itself for
Russia just as urgently as it does for us.
We are always ready to listen
to the concerns that Russia may have over the proposed US Third Site
in Europe. The
United
States has sought to address these concerns through a
number of detailed senior-level briefings to the Russian government. And it has also made some specific
proposals for cooperation with Russia.
And NATO is also doing its share to ensure transparency, by hosting
several discussions with detailed briefings in the NATO-Russia Council.
As of today, Russian rhetoric
has not abated – we are, after all, in an election period. However, we are also receiving other,
more pragmatic signals, such as President Putin’s offer to jointly operate a
radar in Azerbaijan.
It is not for me to judge the specific merits of this proposal, but I
believe it indicates three things:
first, that Russia acknowledges the existence of a potential missile
threat at its periphery; second, Russia is also looking at cooperative
solutions; and third, that a pragmatic compromise on missile defence, based on
common perceptions and common interests, can eventually be found.
Another reason for guarded
optimism is our practical cooperation with
Russia on Theatre Missile Defence. We have completed the second phase of
our work with Russia, which includes an Interoperability Study, and the conduct
of a series of military exercises where we looked at how NATO and Russian TMD
systems could work together to provide protection from ballistic missile threats
to forces that are deployed on operations.
This cooperation continues.
It is solid and it is valuable.
To sum up, given the new
momentum that missile defence has acquired, we must take a fresh look at our
overall missile defence posture. In
particular, we need to examine the implications of the planned
US system in light of the Missile Defence
Feasibility Study that I mentioned earlier. And we will have to examine how our
existing programmes and the proposed US system can be made compatible. So our NATO roadmap on missile defence
is clear: to prepare the ground for discussions – and possible decisions – at
next February’s NATO Defence Ministers meeting and at our next NATO Summit in
Bucharest in April.
Ladies and
Gentlemen,
NATO has successfully left the Cold War behind. On the road to a new
Alliance, we jettisoned many outdated dogmas. For example, no one today speaks of
“out-of-area” anymore. In today’s
security landscape, that terminology has clearly and totally lost its
meaning.
Now I believe that the same
logic should apply to missile defence.
Here, too, we need to get rid of outdated dogmas. We need to measure the value of theatre
and strategic defences against today’s and tomorrow’s security environment, not
against the threats of a bygone era.
Missile defence will not be the answer to all our security problems. But it clearly deserves a more prominent
place in our efforts to cope with the challenges of an uncertain 21st
century. So the discussion and
debate will continue. I thank you very much for your
attention.