Speech by the Secretary General at the 
Conference
“After the Bucharest NATO Summit :  
European and American
Missile Defense 
Perspectives”,
Prague, 5 May 2008
 
Prime 
Minister,
Ministers,
Excellencies,
Ladies and 
Gentlemen,
 
                        
It is a great pleasure to be in your midst today – an important 
conference, important subject, well-timed conference, important decisions.  I am pleased to hear that the 
Czech Republic has completed negotiations with the 
United States of 
America on the establishment of a radar site for the 
so-called US Ballistic Missile Defence system.  The signing of that agreement in the 
near future will be a major step forward I think in the process of building a 
missile defence architecture in Europe.  It 
will also be a major step for the bilateral relationship between the 
Czech Republic and the 
United 
States.  But it 
is also a major development for NATO.  
Because I think it opens a new chapter for the 
Alliance in meeting the new threats of the 
21st century.
 
                        
When people think of NATO, they usually think of responding to immediate 
challenges – a crisis in the Balkans, the 9/11 attacks, or creating security in 
Afghanistan.  
This view of NATO as a kind of fire brigade is only natural: after all, 
NATO has unique capabilities that it can bring to bear in responding to 
immediate problems.  And, hence, it 
is no surprise that the North Atlantic Alliance is very much in 
demand.
 
                        
But the image of NATO as a mere fire brigade is too narrow.  Yes, of course, we must remain capable 
of responding to imminent threats.  
But we must also look ahead – we must scan the strategic horizon for 
potential new challenges, and we must develop common approaches to deal with 
them – making sure we take into account the time needed to develop those 
solutions.  People sometimes tend to 
neglect this dimension 
of NATO.  
And yet it is precisely this pro-active dimension of the 
Alliance that will 
be 
increasingly important as we enter a new strategic environment.  
In tomorrow's uncertain world, we 
can not wait for threats to mature before deciding how to counter 
them.
 
                        
The nature of this new environment is already beginning to take 
shape.  It will be an environment 
that will be marked by the effects of climate change, such as territorial 
conflicts, rising food prices, and migration; it will be characterised by the 
scramble for energy resources; by the emergence of new powers; and by non-state 
actors trying to gain access to deadly 
technologies.
 
                        
It will also be a security environment characterised by the proliferation 
of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.  The nuclear ambitions of 
Iran and 
North 
Korea threaten to set in motion a “domino effect” that 
will be difficult to contain.  And 
the number of states that possess ballistic missiles is already growing - slowly 
but surely. 
 
                        
The threat of a ballistic missile attack touches at the very heart of 
NATO’s collective defence commitment.  
It touches, in other words, at the very core of our 
Alliance.  
That is why we must respond to this challenge – and why we must respond 
together.
 
                        
We have been working on the best way forward on missile defence – 
bilaterally and within NATO – for a considerable period of time.  We have done so against the backdrop of 
a political and public debate that had from time to time its share of 
irrationality.  Too many 
participants in that debate allowed ideological considerations to cloud a 
political and military judgement.
 
                        
As the countries that would host elements of the planned 
US missile defence system, the 
Czech Republic and 
Poland have to bear the brunt of that growing 
debate.  I know that this is not 
easy.
 
                        
Victor Hugo once said that nothing is more powerful than an idea whose 
time has come.  Perhaps that is why 
neither a sometimes erratic debate nor Cold War-style threats could ultimately, 
or should ultimately undermine the project.  And at NATO’s Bucharest Summit – and the 
Prime Minister referred to the Summit more than once – which just took place one month 
ago, the Allies made it very clear that missile defence is a collective effort 
that will not be derailed.
 
                        
The specific deployment of the 
US “Third Site” may involve only a few 
Allies, yet as I said the proliferation of ballistic missiles is a reality that 
concerns us all.  Our security is 
indivisible.  And this fundamental 
principle will guide our work on missile defence in the months and years 
ahead.
 
                        
So where do we stand now, and where are we 
going?
 
                        
First, it is clear that the US “Third Site” will make a substantial 
contribution to the protection of many European Allies.  It is also clear, however, that it will 
not cover all of them.  And that is 
why we need to consider options for a more comprehensive coverage.  Simply put, we need both the 
US missile defence elements and other 
sensors and interceptors.  And this 
means that we need to link the US system with other national systems and 
NATO systems.  Several architectures 
are currently being studied, with a view to inform further debate and potential 
decisions at the next NATO Summit in 2009.
 
                        
Now the question of course is, is such a linking of different systems 
feasible?  The answer is clearly 
“yes”.  NATO has a longstanding 
experience in promoting interoperability, and in integrating different national 
assets into one coherent capability.  
First tests have successfully joined NATO’s so-called Active Layered 
Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence system (ALTBMD), the 
US missile defence, and French and Dutch 
assets.  And as far as the costs and 
performance are concerned, it is clear that an interconnected, NATO-wide system 
would be considerably cheaper and more effective than if individual nations were 
to develop and field their own territorial missile defence 
system.
 
                        
My second point, we need of course to look at the challenge of 
political-military consultations and command and control.  An incoming missile will not allow us 
enough time to convene a meeting of the North Atlantic Council.  We therefore need to develop procedures 
that enable us to react quickly.  
But here, too, NATO does not need to start from scratch.  After all, the 
Alliance now has almost 60 years of experience in 
crisis management procedures, and this will certainly inform our discussions and 
help us to find the right solution.
 
                        
My third point, we need to engage 
Russia.  
Russia has made it clear on many occasions that 
she remains suspicious of the US “Third Site”.  It is therefore essential that we 
continue to involve Russia, both in the NATO-Russia Council and in 
US-Russian bilateral talks, to explain the system and to alleviate their 
concerns.  At the NATO Bucharest 
Summit, we made it clear that we are willing to go even further – in fact, we 
are ready to explore the potential linking of US, NATO and Russian missile 
defence systems.  Sooner or later, 
Moscow will come to realise that 
Russia, too, is not immune to the consequences 
of proliferation.  Once that happens 
– and I hope that it won’t take long – 
Russia will consider NATO’s offer.  And our ongoing cooperation with 
Russia on tactical missile defence could then be 
expanded to include the strategic level as well.
 
Prime 
Minister,
Foreign 
Minister,
Excellencies,
Ladies and 
Gentlemen,
 
                        
Missile defence is not the entire answer to the proliferation 
challenge.  It has to be seen in the 
wider context of arms control and non-proliferation.  And, needless to say, our approach to 
missile defence will also be determined by the evolution of the threat.  For these reasons, the debate about the 
right approach to missile defence will certainly not end today.  However, the parameters of the debate 
have already changed.  Instead of 
talking about the desirability of missile defence, we are now focussing on how 
to make it work.
 
                        
In other words, we have moved the issue of missile defence out of the 
abstract ideological debate and into the real world.  And this is where it belongs:  In a world where fanaticism and 
technological progress can confront us with challenges of unprecedented 
magnitude, missile defence is an expression of our political will to defend our 
vital strategic interests; of our moral responsibility to protect our 
populations; and of our conviction that collective defence in the Alliance 
remains the best way to safeguard the security of future generations.  I thank you very much for your 
attention.