Speech
by NATO
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer
at the Royal United Services Institute
(RUSI),
London, 18 September
2008
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
About two weeks ago, an exasperated NATO Ambassador
asked a question to his colleagues around the Council table: Why is it that we always see so many
crises happening in the month of August?
The question was, of course, a rhetorical one, so no
one felt compelled to respond. But
there can be no doubt that August 2008 will go down in history as a key
moment in international security. “The Guns of August”, to borrow the
title of a famous book, will sound in our ears for some time to come.
We saw
a war erupt in the Caucasus –
with a Russian military response so disproportionate that some observers started
musing about a second Cold War. As
I will try to explain later in my remarks, I donÂ’t believe that a second Cold
War is in the offing. But one thing
is clear: the role that Russia wants
to play in the new international system still remains
uncertain.
At the same time, the month of August and the first
two weeks of September have also seen fierce fighting and a large number of
casualties in Afghanistan – many NATO soldiers and many Afghans have lost their
lives, and I want to use this opportunity to express my sympathy to the loved
ones and friends of all those British soldiers who have made the ultimate
sacrifice.
We
have also seen the Taliban and other extremist forces strengthen
their
positions in the tribal areas along
the border with Afghanistan.
It is thus becoming ever clearer
that success in Afghanistan can
only be achieved if we engage Pakistan in a
common effort against extremism which threatens the future of the entire
region.
Conflict
in the Caucasus, instability in and around
Afghanistan –
these two theatres alone would seem more than one can handle at any given
time. Yet we all know that these
crises are not happening in a
vacuum. Both conflicts will
reverberate far beyond their points of origin. I donÂ’t have to explain at length why
RussiaÂ’s
justification for recognising Abkhazia and South
Ossetia could
set a dangerous precedent – with truly global consequences. Nor do I have to explain at length why
the conflict will have longer-term implications for our energy policy, notably
for the discussion about alternative transit
routes.
The conflict in Afghanistan, too,
is more than a regional issue. It
is about
our response to the global phenomenon of international terrorism.
It is about our readiness to
support fragile young democracies that are trying to take their people out of
poverty and into the modern world.
It is about long-term stability in Central
Asia. And it is about the struggle of moderate
Islam to prevail against the forces of
fanaticism.
Samuel
Johnson once said that the prospect of hanging concentrates the mind. I am not suggesting that we are in any
immediate danger of being hung, but if we donÂ’t want this world to take a turn
for the worse, weÂ’d better concentrate on how best to deal with the challenges
we face. So let me give you my
thoughts on the way ahead – with respect to Russia, and
with respect to Afghanistan.
First;
Russia. Here, the issues are crystal clear. Irrespective of who did what and when in
the August conflict, Russia has
demonstrated a disregard for the sovereignty of a small neighbour, and for
international law. This has created
a major challenge for our partnership.
Both NATO and the EU have made it abundantly clear that the very notion
of partnership implies due respect for certain agreed standards of
behaviour. As long as
Russia
chooses to ignore these standards, there can be no business as usual.
Russia has
long demanded to be treated with respect, as becomes a global power. But respect
has to be earned – by taking one’s global responsibilities and the defence of
universal values seriously, rather than by abusing oneÂ’s military
might.
In
both her actions and her accompanying rhetoric,
Russia has
shown much assertiveness. But what
worries me even more is RussiaÂ’s
apparent readiness to stand against virtually the entire international
community. RussiaÂ’s
perceived temporary gains in Georgia have
come at the cost of her strategic isolation. President Medvedev and Prime Minister
Putin tell us that the West needs Russia, but
that Russia
doesnÂ’t really need the West. I
have no problem with the first part of their statement. Yes, the West does indeed need
Russia. But it is an illusion to believe that
Russia can
go it alone without the West. Going
it alone in this global world is simply not an option.
What next?
Let me be very clear. A
solution to this crisis is possible.
But it
will only be found if all parties are willing to make concessions and to walk
back from where they are today.
Such a solution cannot be found if we simply seek to “punish”
Russia. NATO is not in the punishment
business. Nor is there any need for
us to engage in rhetorical escalation.
We do not need to crank up the volume. So let me tell you how I, as the NATO
Secretary General, see the way ahead.
As a
starting point, we need a sober analysis of the implications of the Caucasus
conflict in general, and of RussiaÂ’s
policy in particular. And then we
must devise a sound policy based on that analysis. This exercise has only just begun, so I
donÂ’t want to pre-empt its outcome.
A few things, however, should be evident.
First,
I do not foresee a U-turn in NATOÂ’s policy vis-Ã -vis
Russia. You need to make a U-turn when youÂ’ve
gone totally wrong. We, however,
have not gone wrong. The key
tenets of our Russia
policy – a policy of constructive engagement – remain sound. We may have to make adjustments in the
way we approach Russia, but
we do not need a new policy. No matter how much we may disagree on
some issues, the fact of the matter is that both NATO and
Russia face
a number of common challenges – and both NATO and
Russia will
be better off by facing them together. That is the reason why we invested so
much in the NATO-Russia partnership.
Second, in this new security context, some have
called for a reappraisal of the balance between an expeditionary NATO and our
core task of collective defence.
Such a
discussion is certainly justified.
But, again, I do not foresee a 180 degree change in our approach. Article 5 already exists, we donÂ’t have
to reinvent it. Neither does
upholding Article 5 require us to return to a Cold War military posture in
Europe.
Third,
irrespective of our approach vis-Ã -vis Russia, we
must support Georgia. Indeed, in many respects, this is the
most important thing that we need to do in the short-term. And we are doing it. We are helping
Georgia to
assess and repair the damage caused by Russian actions. And we will continue to support this
country in realising its Euro-Atlantic
aspirations.
Earlier
this week, I visited Georgia
together with the Ambassadors of the North Atlantic Council. During that visit, we inaugurated the
NATO-Georgia Commission. It conveys
the message – to Georgia, as
well as to Russia –
that geography does not have to determine your destiny, and that the era of
spheres of influence is over.
In
addition to our meetings in Tbilisi, we
also saw the refugees from South
Ossetia who
were camped around Gori. It was a
sobering experience. And it
reinforced us in our strong conviction that the people of
Georgia
cannot afford any more conflict. We
will continue to stand by Georgia, but
we also expect it to remain firmly committed to democracy and reform. And we made that very clear to all our
interlocutors.
Georgia may
remain a bone of contention between Russia and
the West for some time to come. But
this must not prevent us from seeking to cooperate with
Russia
wherever our interests converge.
One key area where this is the case is
Afghanistan.
When
Russia
decided last month to suspend most of her cooperation with NATO, this did not
include cooperation on Afghanistan. This is a clear indication that common
interests can transcend disagreements in other areas. And it reminds us of the singular
importance of Afghanistan in
the broader security equation.
The
outbreak of the Georgian crisis eclipsed
Afghanistan from
the headlines – but not for long.
Now we are back to the torrent of bad news stories of which
Afghanistan seems
to offer a limitless supply.
There is an old adage which says that only bad news
sells. And if that were true, the
publishing industry must have been doing rather well recently.
And
yet we have no reason to be so pessimistic. An objective assessment of the situation
in Afghanistan
should make that clear. Not only is
our cause a just cause, our key objective of creating a safe and secure
Afghanistan that
is able to look after itself remains entirely within our
grasp.
What
gives me reason to be so confident?
Again, let me confine myself to three points. The first one is on security. Yes, there is a widespread perception of
a Taliban resurgence, as a result of some spectacular attacks. But, no, the Taliban have not been able
to capitalise much on it. They
continue to suffer heavy losses. And contrary to some alarmist
predictions, they have not been able to strangle
Kabul. ISAF will not be defeated, neither
tactically nor operationally. And
our training of the Afghan National Army is now enabling that new force to
engage alongside our own – with increasing success, and with popular support.
The ANA now participates in more
than two thirds of ISAFÂ’s operations.
As the ANA expands, it will increasingly be able to deny our opponents
their freedom of movement, hold the gains we make, and ultimately allow
Afghanistan to
take responsibility for its own security.
The
Taliban will not be able to reverse this positive momentum. What they did achieve, however,
is to create a sense of uncertainty that permeates the country and hinders
progress. It is a cruel irony that
the Taliban have now realised that our development efforts in
Afghanistan are
bearing fruit. That is why
they are targeting these very efforts.
What we build, they seek to destroy. Their aim is clear: to convince the
Afghan people that neither the International Community nor their own Government
can provide security for them. And
to convince our own publics that our engagement in
Afghanistan is
doomed to fail.
It is up to us to prove them wrong. And this is my second point: We must see
through their propaganda – and do whatever is necessary to defeat them. This does not just mean to provide the
military resources that are critical for success. It also means to further enhance our
training for the ANA. It means to
capitalise on the recent decrease in drug production, by stepping up ISAFÂ’s
support for the Afghan Government.
It means to lobby even more extensively for a Comprehensive Approach by
the International Community – for an approach that will close the gap between
security and development.
It means to support the preparation
for next yearÂ’s elections, which offer a genuine opportunity to re-energise the
political process in the country.
And it means that our Governments and Parliaments must redouble their
efforts to explain to their constituents why it is in our own security interest
to prevent Afghanistan from sliding back to pre-“9/11” days.
Within
a few months we will have a new Administration in
Washington. Whoever wins, I expect the new President
to increase US forces in Afghanistan and
to focus even more US
effort and attention on stabilising Afghanistan and
on improving security along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Indeed, President Bush has already
started this effort.
While
I of course welcome an even greater US
effort, I believe that it is important that we continue to make this not just a
US
responsibility but a collective transatlantic responsibility. When the telephone rings early next
year, I hope that the other Allies will also be ready, not just with additional
forces, but also with extra contributions to training
AfghanistanÂ’s
National Army and Police, strengthening its institutions and developing its
economy.
Success
in Afghanistan also
means stepping up our political engagement
with her neighbours, notably
Pakistan. And this is my third point. As long as
PakistanÂ’s
border region remains a sanctuary for insurgents,
Afghanistan will
never become truly secure. Clearly,
it is up to Pakistan to
define its own security interests.
LetÂ’s be honest: there are
some who believe that instability in Afghanistan is
somehow in PakistanÂ’s
security interest. And there are
others who believe that extremism in Pakistan could
be dealt with by diverting it into Afghanistan. But I fail to see how a permanently
unstable Afghanistan would
somehow be conducive to PakistanÂ’s own
long-term security.
This should
be a key argument in our dialogue with Islamabad – a
dialogue that we must intensify.
I will
be going to Islamabad next
month to meet with PakistanÂ’s new
civilian leaders as well as the Chief of Defence. We all need to do a better job together
of monitoring and controlling the border, and we need to intensify the work of
our Tripartite Commission where our military commanders meet to coordinate their
approaches. Above all, we need to
establish a permanent dialogue between Afghanistan,
Pakistan and
the international community to develop a joint strategy. The election of a new Pakistani President
gives me hope that this is the right time for a new approach.
At the
same time, we need to develop a framework for the broader region. AfghanistanÂ’s
neighbours also suffer from the turmoil in that country – just think of the
problems that Iran is
currently facing from Afghan narcotics.
We need to bring as many as we can into a process of regional
cooperation. The pacification of
the Afghan-Pakistani border is not the panacea for all our problems. As in so many other parts of the world,
long term stability and prosperity can only come from the development of a
regional framework and economic integration. And I believe that more thought should
go into how we achieve this.
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The events in the Caucasus and in Central
Asia
remind us of the challenges our transatlantic community must face. But they also reaffirm the logic of
Europe and North
America
acting together. When we do, we can
bring about real positive change.
And
NATO will remain a unique tool at our disposal. What started as an idea in the minds of
Ernest Bevin and Dean Acheson 60 years ago has become an indispensable pillar of
international order. Let us use our
Alliance, and
use its potential to full effect.