“Projecting Stability”
Speech by NATO Secretary
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
at the “Fundacion
para las Relaciones Internacionales
y el Dialogo Exterior”
(FRIDE)
Madrid, Spain -- 10 July 2006
Ladies
and Gentlemen,
It is a pleasure to be at FRIDE today. This institute has a strong
reputation for taking a broad view of security – taking democracy and
democratic values as a starting point. It is a view that I, and the NATO
Allies, share.
Democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law form the foundation
upon which the North Atlantic Alliance is built. But these values cannot be
taken for granted. They are constantly under threat be it from terrorism, from
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or from the effects of failed
and failing states.
Just a few days ago, the North Atlantic Council reacted to missile tests
by North Korea, calling on North Korea
to verifiably end its nuclear and related programmes. North Korean activities
represent a threat international security and all of us in international
community must be prepared to respond firmly.
We have a responsibility to defend our values - and sometimes, that
responsibility, regrettably, has a price. A high price which has been paid by Spain in the past and as recently as yesterday
when a Spanish soldier lost his life in Afghanistan. Yet, despite these
tragic losses, Spain has
continued to provide strong support for the Alliance, because you understand how
important it is to defend our core values.
So, to defend our values against this
and other new threats, NATO, as a political-military Alliance, requires a range
of tools: stronger partnerships and partnerships with key Nations; not a global
NATO but a NATO with global partners that share our values; we also need closer
cooperation with other international organisations, in particular the United
Nations and the European Union; enhanced political dialogue on security issues;
as well as stronger military capabilities. This broad approach to security - projecting
stability - is demonstrated by the wide geographic and functional range of
NATO’s current operational commitments. And it is demonstrated most
clearly of all in our operation in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is the Alliance’s
top priority. We must not fail in our mission there. We have to prevent Afghanistan
once again exporting terrorism. Madrid
knows only too well the consequences of that form of terrorism. Other Allies
have also suffered the horrendous consequences of such terrorist attacks. And
that is why we have to be engaged in Afghanistan, and why NATO has to
succeed.
NATO’s objective is clear. Under a
UN mandate, we support the Government of Afghanistan by assisting them to
provide the necessary security so that reconstruction and development can take
place. This is a longer term commitment.
The security situation is demanding, but we
should build on the success we have already had in the North and West of the
country. Our strategy has already delivered improvements in security and in the
quality of life for many of the Afghani people. And Spain has made, and continues to
make, a major contribution to that success.
NATO and its partners, 37 nations in all,
are making a major military effort in Afghanistan. This is essential,
but it is not enough. We need key civilian actors, the UN, the EU, the G8 and
NGOs, among others, to redouble their efforts at civilian reconstruction and
building the capacity of Afghan institutions. And we need the Afghan government
to assume ownership in key areas, such as counter-narcotics.
It is clear that we are being tested by
the enemies of democracy there. And as NATO-ISAF progressively takes
responsibility for more of the country, they will test us even further. But we
will continue to respond fairly, resolutely and robustly – with all
Allies providing full political and military support to this vital operation,
we will prevail.
But Afghanistan
is not our only engagement. NATO’s
commitment to the Balkans is unwavering. The Alliance’s political determination and
its military operations have made a vital contribution to stopping the fighting
and setting the countries of the region well on the road to Euro-Atlantic
integration. NATO can be proud of what it has achieved so far in assisting the
region, but more remains to be done – by NATO, by other organisations, and
by the countries themselves.
In Bosnia and
Herzegovina, through the NATO Headquarters
Sarajevo, NATO continues to provide advice and assistance, especially in the
field of Defence Reform. A single military force has been created from armies
that were at war with each other only 10 years ago – a truly remarkable
achievement.
And in Kosovo, NATO troops, with an important Spanish contingent,
continue to keep the peace and provide the safe environment for the
UN-sponsored status talks to proceed. The outcome of these talks later this
year will be a key step in the further stabilisation of the region. NATO will
remain committed to Kosovo as long as needed.
In Iraq,
NATO is training Iraqi security forces to allow them to take on more
responsibility for their own security. And in Africa, African Union
peacekeeping troops are being airlifted into the Darfur region of Sudan
by NATO aircraft, and we are also providing headquarters training to that
force. In the Mediterranean, NATO navies in
operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR are conducting anti-terrorism patrols.
And as you know, with significant Spanish
support, we delivered emergency humanitarian relief to the victims of last
October’s earthquake in Pakistan.
I would like to say how much I appreciated Spain’s efforts in this
regard. It was a “first” in many respects for NATO, and clearly
demonstrated the flexibility of the Alliance;
the validity of our Response Force; and the wide utility of the Alliance’s unique
skills, capabilities, and command structure. And of course, it also
demonstrated again the important role performed by Spain’s armed forces in NATO
operations.
These operational commitments I’ve just
described, across three continents, show in the clearest possible way how much
NATO has changed, or, to use the NATO jargon, transformed. And that
transformation is embodied in NATO’s new approach to security -
projecting stability. To ensure that we can continue to pursue this approach successfully,
NATO Heads of State and Government will meet, in Riga,
in November, to direct the continuing transformation of the Alliance.
Although the Riga
meeting is still several months away, and new issues might need to be raised at
the meeting in response to world events, I currently anticipate that the Riga agenda will focus on
three “baskets” of work. The first of these covers our
operations. This then links to the second, which covers our military
capabilities. And the third covers the major political issues. Let me say a
few words about some of the principal topics in each of these baskets.
I have already spoken about out operations and
commitments. At Riga,
I expect Heads of State and Government will provide direction for their further
development. For example, they will need to consider the situation in Afghanistan.
They will need to consider how NATO’s military and political engagement
can continue to contribute to the future development of Kosovo. And they will
need to consider their response to any additional requests for assistance
relating to the crisis in Darfur.
But Heads of State and Government will also want to
ensure that NATO has the right capabilities to maximise our chances of success
on these operations and missions. And this leads me to the second
“basket” of work at Riga
- our military capabilities.
To project stability, the Alliance needs forces that can react quickly;
that can be deployed over strategic distance, and then sustained over a long
period of time. And we are aiming to achieve
forces that are capable of performing both the high intensity combat tasks and
post-conflict peacekeeping and reconstruction work.
We
have already made good progress in developing such capabilities. The NATO
Response Force, for example, has just passed a critical test in a major
exercise on Cape Verde,
again with a considerable Spanish contribution. And it should be fully
operational by the time of the Riga Summit.
But we need to do more. We need to acquire access to more strategic
airlift, to develop and strengthen our special forces and to enhance
deployability and sustainability capabilities.
We also need to better match our political decisions and military
commitments and make it easier for nations to commit to operations. So, we are
reviewing our force planning and force generation procedures. And we are
looking closely at our funding arrangements All these steps will ensure that
future missions can be better planned, equipped, and paid for.
And on the subject of “paid for”, let me
point out that military transformation does not come free – it has to be
funded. To be perfectly blunt, if Allies wish to attain the political
ambitions that they have set for NATO, then there simply is no alternative than
to provide the necessary resources and capabilities, if necessary by raising
defence spending.
It is and will remain the responsibility of each
allied nation to make the appropriate efforts and contributions to NATO
operations and missions. But we have to avoid that the perspective of very
costly short notice deployments become a disincentive to future contributions.
That is why we are looking into possibilities for the judicious use of common
funding, notably in the key area of strategic lift.
Finally, at Riga, there is the political
“basket”. This includes enlargement, our partnerships, and a
training initiative. NATO’s enlargement policy has already contributed
significantly to spreading stability and security, especially through Central
and Eastern Europe. And at Riga,
we will wish to emphasise our continued commitment to the open door policy and
to further enlargement of this Alliance.
But I do not expect invitations to join the Alliance to be issued. Instead, I believe
Allies will probably encourage our three current membership aspirants, Albania, Croatia
and the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, to continue the efforts they are making to
qualify for membership. And Allies will probably also announce their further
responses to Ukraine’s,
as well as to Georgia’s,
declared interest in joining the Alliance.
NATO’s partnerships are another success story. We
have been building links with non-member countries since the end of the Cold
War. First throughout Europe, the Caucasus and Central
Asia. Then, with strong Spanish support, we reached out across
the Mediterranean to states in Northern Africa and the Middle
East. And most recently, we started to build new ties to states
in the Gulf region.
At Riga, we
will seek to preserve the elements of our
partnership frameworks that work well, and at the same time make them even more
valuable – both for our partners, and for the Alliance. And we shall
look to build closer ties with interested countries such as Australia, New
Zealand, South Korea
and Japan.
These countries share our values, and they
share our security concerns. They have demonstrated an
increasing readiness to assume security responsibilities beyond their own
borders, and have expressed a desire to work more closely with NATO. But let
me be clear, cooperating with such faraway partners will not turn NATO into a
global policeman. It will, however, allow us to build global coalitions. And
that is a key requirement for projecting stability.
We are also looking to further enhance our outreach to
our partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
The idea of a NATO training initiative has received widespread support and
interest. The initial focus of such an initiative would be the countries from
the broader Middle East region, but I hope
that other regions could be involved at a later stage as well.
I have highlighted for you the key
subjects for the Riga
summit this November. But it would be wrong to think that these are the only
issues on NATO’s plate. The Alliance’s
overall agenda is broader. Independent of the summit, we continue to work
closely with Russia
and look to deepen this essential relationship even further.
And we continue to work towards
establishing closer ties with other institutions, notably the EU and the UN. We
need effective relationships with the other international institutions and
non-governmental organisations, so that we are all working to the same end,
with as little duplication of effort and mutual interference as possible.
Cooperation on the ground is working relatively well, but we need greater
cooperation at the institutional level.
I appreciate that this is a sensitive field, raising
as it does questions about the scope of the Alliance’s activities. And the last
thing I would wish to suggest is that NATO should claim ownership over, or a
lead-role in, reconstruction or other tasks that are traditionally dealt with
by others. Nor should we feel tempted to develop capabilities strictly for
civilian purposes. But I do strongly believe we need to improve the
coordination of effort across the international community
Finally, we must continue to strengthen the role of
NATO as a forum for political dialogue. No security related topic should be
off limits. It is absolutely essential that we do not shy away from debating
the key issues, especially those relating to NATO’s roles in matters such
as energy security and humanitarian relief operations. Because discussion and
debate are healthy and are the preconditions for consensus.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
At the start of my remarks I highlighted the
fundamental common values of freedom and democracy and I explained how
NATO’s approach plays a vital role in safeguarding those values. And
this approach depends on Allies accepting the
responsibility to act where and when required – whether the issue is to
prevent terrorism or to provide humanitarian relief.
Let me conclude by saying once again that I am deeply grateful for Spain’s
commitment. It is this strong sense of solidarity that underpins NATO –
and that will ensure that our Alliance
can continue to project security and safeguard the values that we in NATO, and
you at FRIDE, hold so dear.