- Global NATO: Overdue or Overstretch?
Secretary GeneralÂ’s Speech at the SDA Conference
Brussels, 6 November 2006
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Good
morning. It’s great to be back at the SDA. “Global NATO:
Overdue or Overstretch”, that’s an interesting combination of words
another Gilles Merritt classic! It is obviously intended to
provoke and, I admit, it works. So let me focus on the theme
of the conference, and offer you my views on both the terms “global” and
“overstretch”.
I have
said it on many occasions, and I will say it again here today: we donÂ’t
need a global NATO. That is not what our transformation is
all about. The kind of NATO that we need and that we are
successfully creating is an Alliance that defends its members
against global threats: terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and failed states. To counter these threats, NATO
doesn’t need to become a “gendarme du monde”. What we need is an
increasingly global approach to security, with organisations, including
NATO, playing their respective roles.
But
doesnÂ’t such a demanding job description invite the danger of
“overstretch”, as the conference theme implies. Is the need for
NATO to defend against global threats an invitation to get entangled in
ever more demanding engagements, yet with limited means?
Clearly,
coping with an ever increasing set of demands will remain a constant
challenge. Right now, more than 50,000 soldiers are serving under
NATO command in operations and missions on three continents. We
have never seen our resources stretched like this before. And since
the demand for NATO will not diminish, but certainly grow further, we
must make sure the Alliance is able to deliver. And I believe that
means we should concentrate on six key areas.
Number
one, we need to continue to build up our capabilities.
At our
Riga Summit in three weeksÂ’ time, we will bring together key strands of
NATOÂ’s work in that area, including missile defence, air-to-ground
surveillance, terrorism-related work, and defence against weapons of mass
destruction. [13 NATO-nations and one partner will sign a
Memorandum of Understanding on the collective use of C-17 strategic
transport aircraft.] And the NATO Response Force should reach its
Full Operational Capability.
This
demonstrates the tremendous progress we have already achieved. But
I believe that even more needs to be done beyond Riga. We also need
a much clearer NATO framework for training and employing Special
Forces. ThatÂ’s why the Riga Summit will not be an end point, but
merely a stepping stone in our continuing military transformation
process.
Of course,
having the right capabilities means more than having the right
hardware. It also includes having the right defence planning
system. ThatÂ’s why we are currently in the process of fine-tuning
our defence planning process, based on the Comprehensive Political
Guidance to be published in Riga. This is the framework which sets out
the sort of Defence Capabilities we need to tackle the challenges we are
most likely to face tomorrow. We need a planning process that is
even more capabilities-based, even more tailored to the specific needs of
individual Allies, and even more adaptive to deal with potential
shortfalls.
My second
point: We need to share risks and burdens more equitably.
One
glaring example is the question of caveats and national restrictions on
in theatre use of our forces. When it comes to sending their
soldiers into operations, some NATO nations still insist on all kinds of
restrictions. This limits the usability of their forces and
it inhibits our commandersÂ’ flexibility. In recent months, we have
made progress in removing some of those caveats, yet we need to make an
even greater effort. Today, NATO needs to cover the full spectrum
of operations, from combat to peacekeeping. ThatÂ’s why putting
caveats on operations means putting caveats on NATOÂ’s future. At
Riga, I will convey this message to our Heads of State and Government,
loud and clear.
Another
important element of burden-sharing is the reform of our funding
arrangements. Just look at the NATO Response Force. According to
our current rules, “costs lie where they fall”, which means that nations
pay their own way in Alliance operations. If the NRF is deployed,
only those nations who are in the Force at the time of its deployment
have to pay. In other words, if youÂ’re not in the NRF at that time,
you donÂ’t pay. YouÂ’re lucky. To me, this is almost a lottery,
not a funding arrangement for an Alliance built on solidarity.
For this
reason, I have proposed to extend common funding for a trial period for
short term NRF deployments, particularly to the strategic airlift
element. Obviously, this is matter under discussion. But if
it works, it would significantly enhance the NRFÂ’s credibility and give
it the catalyst role we want it to play for our force
transformation. At the very least, it would take away national
alibis for not committing.
My third
point: We need to coordinate better with other actors.
A key
lesson from the Balkans and now Afghanistan is the need to work more
closely with other international organisations governmental and
non-governmental. Security and development go hand it hand, we all
know that. But we donÂ’t always act as if we do. There is
still too much separation between those who provide security and those
who provide development.
We must
bridge that gap. We need to coordinate much more closely with the
UN, the EU, the NGOs and not just in the field, but also at the
strategic level. Nowhere is this more evident than in Kosovo and
Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, under NATOÂ’s lead, ISAF has now
created a window of opportunity for development. It has to be
exploited fully and quickly. NATO is doing a lot, but we are
neither a relief organisation nor a reconstruction agency. Now is
the time for the international community to step in and help push
Afghanistan further in the right direction.
Fourth, we
need to further develop our partnerships.
The
strategic value of NATOÂ’s partnership policy is now beyond doubt. A
NATO without partners has become truly unthinkable. But even good
things can be made even better. In particular, we need to make our
various partnership frameworks more coherent. To this end, we hope
to make the tools from our Partnership for Peace programme available for
other partnership frameworks, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue and the
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will also look at ways to
exploit NATOÂ’s expertise in training other countriesÂ’ security forces,
notably in the Middle East.
And, last
but certainly not least, we are going to deepen our ties with countries
in the Asia-Pacific region. This is a most timely
development. Australia and New Zealand are already involved with us
in Afghanistan. Japan and South Korea have also shown a willingness
to shoulder a greater share of the international security burden. We all
face the same threats and it is in their interest, as well as our own,
that we come closer together.
Again, as
I said at the beginning of my remarks, we donÂ’t need a global NATO.
And I do not believe that anyone has suggested extending NATOÂ’s
membership to Asia. Such notions are a diversion. The real
issue is this: in dealing with “globalised insecurity”, it matters less
and less where a country sits on the map. What matters more is its
mental map its willingness to engage, together with others,
to make a difference. That is the logic of NATOÂ’s global
partnerships. It is simply a reflection of our transition from a
geographical approach towards a functional approach to
security.
Point
Number Five: We need enhanced political dialogue.
Given the
complex nature of our security environment, we can no longer look at NATO
exclusively through the prism of capabilities. Again, Afghanistan
is a case in point. To make a difference there, youÂ’ve got to have
sufficient military power, but you also need to have reconstruction and
development, counter-narcotics policies, and democracy-building. In
other words, Afghanistan demonstrates very clearly that we need to look
at security in a more comprehensive fashion.
Such a
holistic view requires, first and foremost, dialogue. It requires
that we look at NATO not just as a force generation device, but also as a
forum for a much more forward-looking discussion on future threats and
challenges. In particular, we need to have an enlightened
discussion on issues that require a clearer definition of what NATOÂ’s
role should or should not be.
Energy
security is a case in point. There are some who feel that this is
not an appropriate subject for NATO, but others who believe just the
opposite. My view is that the issue of energy security, to use a
mixed metaphor, is coming down the pipeline, and that we need to look at
what NATOÂ’s added value could be. As Secretary General, I will
continue to stimulate serious thinking on this and other vital
issues in NATOÂ’s capitals as well as through debate among its
member nations.
My final
point: We need to break the deadlock in the NATO-EU
relationship. This relationship is currently suffering from
“understretch” rather than overstretch. Indeed, given the magnitude
of todayÂ’s security challenges, it is remarkable how narrow the common
agenda of both institutions remains. All this despite many efforts,
including by the SDA, to bring NATO and the EU closer together.
I am under
no illusion about the time it will take to overcome the well-known formal
obstacles to our cooperation. But this does not mean that we are
condemned to inaction. NATO and the EU need a sustained
dialogue about harmonising their military transformation, notably the NRF
and the EU Battle Groups. They also need a sustained dialogue on
Kosovo, where smooth cooperation between NATO and EU will become ever
more important in the months ahead.
Our
organisations also need to get away from replicating each othersÂ’
initiatives. If NATO or the EU has come up with a worthwhile
project, the other institution should not seek to create a similar
initiative, but rather support the one that exists. NATO and the EU
are in the business of security, not engaged in a beauty contest.
So, even
if NATO-EU relations are not figuring on our Riga agenda, they should
continue to figure prominently on our “to-do-list” in the months
ahead. Because they are key to developing a truly holistic approach
to security.
Ladies and
Gentlemen,
I have
laid out six steps that NATO needs to take in order to deliver security
in new ways and in new places. Some of these steps will be taken at
Riga, others will take longer. After all, there will most probably
be another Summit in 2008. And given NATOÂ’s
60th anniversary in 2009, we may well have
yet another Summit opportunity.
This tight
sequence of Summits will maintain some healthy pressure on moving NATOÂ’s
transformation forward and that is just as well. Because in a
world of global challenges, institutions are no longer judged by what
they represent. They are judged by what they actually achieve.
Thank
you.