DoD Press Briefing with Maj. Gen. Newton from the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.
        
         
                      MICHAEL WYNNE (secretary of the Air Force):  Good afternoon, 
          
 
          ladies and gentlemen.  My name is Mike Wynne, and I'm the secretary of the 
          
 
          United States Air Force.  I want to thank you for being here.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Normally it is our policy to neither confirm nor deny as to whether 
          
 
          were nuclear weapons involved.  In this particular instance, I'm going 
          
 
          to make an exception, a one-time exception.  You know that it would not 
          
 
          -- we would not be this upset with ourselves nor be striving to restore 
          
 
          confidence if this did not involve nuclear weapons.  And that's where I 
          
 
          think the exception to policy has to go. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Thank you for being here this afternoon.  The American public has 
          
 
          placed great trust and confidence in its Air Force to safeguard our  
          
 
          country's strategic weapons.  We have for the past 60 years and will 
          
 
          continue to execute this important mission of providing security for all 
          
 
          weapons.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      However, as you know, nearly two months ago, a series of apparent 
          
 
          errors led to a breakdown in munitions-handling procedures, and it 
          
 
          resulted in our improper and unauthorized transfer of six weapons. This 
          
 
          was an unacceptable mistake and a clear deviation from our exacting 
          
 
          standards.  We hold ourselves accountable to the American people and 
          
 
          want to ensure proper corrective action has been taken. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      As you know, when the incident occurred, we immediately established 
          
 
          that there was never an unsafe condition and reported it our national 
          
 
          leadership, including the secretary of Defense as well as the president. 
          
 
           
          
 
           
          
 
                      At the same time, we promised the American public we would conduct 
          
 
          a thorough investigation and present the findings of the investigation to 
          
 
          our leadership, to our elected leaders and to you, the public.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      General Ronald Keys, who was then commander of Air Combat 
          
 
          Command, directed Major General Doug Raaberg to conduct a commander- 
          
 
          directed investigation to find out the facts, to determine the causes and to 
          
 
          identify corrective action.  The report is complete, and we briefed the 
          
 
          findings to the secretary of Defense this afternoon.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Today Major General Richard Newton -- goes by "Dick" -- is here to 
          
 
          talk to you about the Minot incident.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      But before I turn the podium over to General Newton, I want to assure 
          
 
          everyone that additional decisive actions are being taken to 
          
 
          aggressively examine and implement corrective measures at all levels of 
          
 
          our Air Force. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      The Air Force directed unlimited nuclear surety inspections at every 
          
 
          nuclear-capable unit in our Air Force.  Our major command Inspector 
          
 
          General Offices are methodically conducting the investigations now. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Secretary Gates has asked retired Air Force Chief of Staff General 
          
 
          Larry Welch to lead an ongoing Defense Science Board standing task force 
          
 
          on nuclear weapon surety to review security procedures and look more 
          
 
          broadly at DOD policies and procedures to ensure all factors that led to 
          
 
          this incident are explored and addressed. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Also, Congress requested a top-to-bottom review of the Department 
          
 
          of Defense and Department Energy nuclear procedures.  In addition to these, 
          
 
          General Moseley and I charted an Air Force Blue Ribbon Review to examine 
          
 
          all aspects of our nuclear weapons policy and procedure across all 
          
 
          levels of our Air Force.  We have asked Major General Polly Peyer to 
          
 
          chair this Blue Ribbon Review and make recommendations as to how we can 
          
 
          improve the Air Force's capability to safely and securely perform our 
          
 
          nuclear weapons responsibility. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      In regard to the command-directed investigation report, I received an 
          
 
          outbrief two days ago and have had a chance to review the report myself. 
          
 
           I personally went to Minot and Barksdale Air Force Bases to see the 
          
 
          process and ensure continued safe and disciplined operations.  I spoke 
          
 
          with Major General Raaberg en route, and we agreed that his 
          
 
          investigation would be paramount.  I firmly believe he has conducted a 
          
 
          thorough and rigorous investigation.  He provided us a solid 
          
 
          understanding of what happened at Minot and at Barksdale, and we are 
          
 
          making all appropriate changes to ensure that this has a minimal chance 
          
 
          of ever happening again, but we would really like to ensure it never 
          
 
          happens again. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      General Newton is currently the assistant deputy chief of staff for 
          
 
          Operations, Plans and Requirements here at headquarters.  He's a command 
          
 
          pilot with flight time in the B-2, the B-1 and the B-52. Additionally, 
          
 
          he was commander of the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot from February of 00 to 
          
 
          December of 01, so he is very familiar with the mission of our bomb 
          
 
          wings and specifically operations at Minot. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      He is here today to speak with you about what happened at Minot in l
          
 
          late August, to discuss what accountability actions have occurred and to 
          
 
          answer your questions. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Before I leave, I must stress that nothing in military procedures is 
          
 
          more important than ensuring the control and custody of our weapons.  We 
          
 
          will determine areas that need to be held to higher account and hold 
          
 
          those accountable who fall short of our standards. We're determined to 
          
 
          understand exactly what mistakes were made and what changes are needed 
          
 
          to ensure that they will not be repeated. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      We know America counts on us.  And through our steady, unwavering 
          
 
          resolve and actions, our Air Force will live up to the expectations of 
          
 
          our nation.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Thank you.  And now I'll turn it over to General Newton. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      This afternoon I will share with you what I can about how the weapons 
          
 
          transfer error occurred, our corrective actions and our efforts to 
          
 
          ensure accountability.  The countless times our dedicated airmen have 
          
 
          transferred weapons in our nation's arsenal, nothing like this has ever 
          
 
          occurred.  This was a failure to follow procedures, procedures which 
          
 
          have proven to be sound.  It involved a limited number of airmen at two 
          
 
          bases.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Our extensive six-week investigation found that this was an isolated 
          
 
          incident and that the weapons never left the custody of airmen, were 
          
 
          never unsecured; but clearly, this incident is unacceptable to the 
          
 
          people of the United States and to the United States Air Force.  We owe 
          
 
          the nation nothing less than adherence to the highest standards. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      In addition, our investigation found that there has been an erosion of 
          
 
          adherence to weapons-handling standards at Minot Air Force Base and at 
          
 
          Barksdale Air Force Base.  We have acted quickly and decisively to 
          
 
          rectify this.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Because of this error, we are aggressively examining and implementing 
          
 
          corrective measures to our weapons-handling and transfer process. 
          
 
          Corrective actions will ensure our munitions are handled precisely and 
          
 
          safely 100 percent of the time.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      This week, the commander of Air Combat Command relieved several 
          
 
          officers.  Minot's Wing commander and Maintenance Group commander and 
          
 
          Barksdale's Operation Group commander received administrative action and 
          
 
          were relieved of command.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      The commander of Air Combat Command also took four other 
          
 
          specific actions to date at the group and squadron level, lieutenant colonel 
          
 
          and below.  But for privacy reasons we will not discuss specific positions, 
          
 
          individuals or actions. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      As you know, the Munitions Squadron commander at Minot Air Force 
          
 
          Base was relieved shortly after this incident.  The commander of Air Combat 
          
 
          Command carefully considered individuals at all ranks and levels for 
          
 
          accountability.  In addition, he also took actions to temporarily or 
          
 
          permanently decertify specific individuals from the Personnel 
          
 
          Reliability Program.  The Air Force Personnel Reliability Program 
          
 
          ensures the reliability of Air Force personnel who handle, guard and 
          
 
          move our most sensitive weapons. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      The commander of Air Combat Command also tasked the 12th Air 
          
 
          Force commander, Lieutenant General Seip, to review the report and 
          
 
          independently assess the culpability of all Air Force members who were 
          
 
          involved with the weapons transfer.  Should the 12th Air Force commander 
          
 
          determine disciplinary or adverse administrative action is appropriate 
          
 
          for selected individuals, arrangements will be made to place those 
          
 
          individuals under the jurisdiction of the 12th Air Force commander.  As 
          
 
          the general court-martial convening authority, Lieutenant General Seip 
          
 
          has a variety of options at his disposal. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      With that said, I'll provide you an explanation of the incident and 
          
 
           
          
 
          then I'll take your questions.  
          
 
           
          
 
                      First off, a series of procedural breakdowns and human errors led to 
          
 
          the loading and transportation of weapons, weapons that should not have 
          
 
          been moved, from Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, to Barksdale Air 
          
 
          Force Base, Louisiana.  A Barksdale-assigned B-52 was on the ground 
          
 
          August 29th at Minot prepared to fly 12 cruise missiles back to 
          
 
          Louisiana.  In accordance with international treaties, the Air Force was 
          
 
          consolidating advanced cruise missiles for eventual elimination. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Let me walk you through the five procedural errors that occurred in 
          
 
          conjunction with that mission that facilitated this serious and 
          
 
          unprecedented incident. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      As you see here, if we'll bring up slide 1, please, on the morning of 
          
 
          August 29th, a team of Minot airmen was dispatched to the base weapons 
          
 
          storage area to pick up and transport two pylons to a Barksdale B-52 
          
 
          aircraft. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      For those of you unfamiliar with the term "pylon," for our purposes 
          
 
          today, a pylon is a self-contained package of six cruise missiles that 
          
 
          can be quickly mounted to the wing of a B-52.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      What set this in motion, our investigation found, is that one of the 
          
 
          two pylons for this flight, a tactical ferry mission, had not been 
          
 
          properly prepared.  Part of Air Combat Command's investigation 
          
 
          determined that the reason it was not properly prepared was the fact 
          
 
          that a formal scheduling process, for tracking the status of the 
          
 
          missiles, had been subverted in favor of an informal process that did 
          
 
          not identify this pylon as prepared for the flight.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Okay, so let's talk about what happened on August 29th.  On that day, 
          
 
          the first procedural error occurred around 8: in the morning, when 
          
 
          airmen assigned to the weapons storage are failed to examine all the 
          
 
          pylons located in the storage area.  The second procedural failure 
          
 
          occurred when the crew operating the trailer that was moving the pylons 
          
 
          to the aircraft began hooking up while the required pylon inspection was 
          
 
          still underway.  The third failure occurred when the crew failed to 
          
 
          verify the payload before hooking it up to the trailer for transport.  
          
 
          The crew is required to inspect the munitions before departing.  They 
          
 
          did not do that.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      The fourth failure occurred when the Minot munitions control center 
          
 
          failed to verify the status of the pylons being loaded at about 9:25 in 
          
 
          the morning.  The munitions control center failed to assess a database, 
          
 
          as required, that would have alerted them that one of the pylons was not 
          
 
          properly prepared for transfer.  At this point, the wrong weapons, 
          
 
          already in transit to the flightline, and several critical safeguard 
          
 
          procedures had been disregarded.  The Minot munitions handlers then 
          
 
          loaded the pylons onto the B-52, and they remained there overnight on a 
          
 
          secure flightline.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      A fifth failure occurred the next morning, when the Barksdale- assigned 
          
 
          B-52 instructor radar navigator neglected to check all missiles loaded 
          
 
          for transport, as required.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      The instructor radar navigator performed only a spot check, and only 
          
 
          on the right pylon, the one that had been properly prepared for transport.  
          
 
          The pylon carrying the wrong weapon was never inspected. Those factors 
          
 
          and disregard for procedures collectively contributed to this serious 
          
 
          incident.  
          
 
           
          
 
                      The B-52 took off at 8:40 on the following day and arrived at Barksdale 
          
 
          Air Force Base at 11:23 that very same morning.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      At Barksdale, the munitions personnel followed the correct 
          
 
          procedures.  They unloaded the weapons between 7: and 8:30 that evening, 
          
 
          inspected  them and immediately reported the mistake and established 
          
 
          appropriate  security.  Officials at Barksdale then notified the chain of 
          
 
          command. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      We want to give you also a visual to help understand the sequence of 
          
 
          events.  On the screen to my left is a slide that depicts the points of 
          
 
          failure.  Moving clockwise, and starting in the upper right- hand side, 
          
 
          you see a standard hangar.  This is where the procedural errors began.  
          
 
          The doors opened, our crews entered, and did not perform the required 
          
 
          inspection.  The truck then pulls up too soon. At this point, 
          
 
          inspections still have not been completed. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      At the bottom of the slide are images of the actual pylons leaving the 
          
 
          hangar.  This shows the pylon that should have been inspected and 
          
 
          identified as not prepared for transfer.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Also depicted on the slide is a B-52 loaded and prepared for departure. 
          
 
           Again the proper inspections and checklist procedures did not occur.  
          
 
          This was the last opportunity for our airmen to identify the error 
          
 
          before the aircraft took off. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Now let me address our response.  The Air Force acted swiftly when 
          
 
          the incident occurred.  Our actions have included:  We've conducted an Air 
          
 
          Force-wide stockpile inventory and verified no additional discrepancies. 
          
 
           The commander of Air Combat Command, then General Ron Keys, directed 
          
 
          this investigation be led by Major General Raaberg.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      As I stated, commanders have been relieved.  Air Force Secretary 
          
 
          Wynne directed nuclear surety inspections for nuclear-capable units with 
          
 
          oversight of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      All units inspected to date have received a satisfactory rating, the 
          
 
          highest rating possible.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      The commander of Air Combat Command decertified the 5th Bomb 
          
 
          Wing from specific missions and suspended tactical ferry operations.  We 
          
 
          ordered a one day stand-down of appropriate Air Force units, and the 
          
 
          commander of Air Combat Command directed a one-day stand-down of his 
          
 
          entire command.  
          
 
           
          
 
           
          
 
                      The secretary of the Air Force and chief of staff sent messages to all 
          
 
          airmen, emphasizing the critical importance of discipline, attention to 
          
 
          detail and responsibility.  Senior Air Force leadership chartered a blue 
          
 
          ribbon review, which is examining policies and procedures across all 
          
 
          levels of organization, not just in Air Combat Command, but through the 
          
 
          entire force.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      To conclude, this was an unacceptable error that resulted in an 
          
 
          unprecedented stream of procedural failures.  We are accountable to 
          
 
          Congress and we are accountable to the American people.  I can assure 
          
 
          everyone we're taking the corrective actions and continuing to examine 
          
 
          our policies and our procedures to ensure the integrity of our mission.  
          
 
          From all levels, the Air Force is committed to safely, securely and 
          
 
          reliably handling of our nation's weapons.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      And with that, I'll take your questions. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     General, you used the words, I think secured flightline. Does 
          
 
          that mean that while the plane sat in Minot overnight, it was secured to 
          
 
          the level that it would have been had it been known that nuclear weapons 
          
 
          were on it? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  The aircraft when it was at Minot Air Force Base on the 
          
 
          29th and the 30th was in a secure environment because it was on a secure 
          
 
          Air Force flightline at Minot Air Force Base.  And so it was secure.  
          
 
           
          
 
                      Yes? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Two-part question.  The first -- you mentioned early in your 
          
 
          briefing that there's been -- there was an erosion of adherence to the 
          
 
          procedures.  Were you able to find out why that had been?  Is this 
          
 
          something that became so routine that people just sort of flippantly  
          
 
          weren't paying attention to the rules? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  This was -- this is a serious error.  We've 
          
 
          determined through a very thorough and rigorous investigation that it is an 
          
 
          isolated incident due to lack of attention to detail, adherence to 
          
 
          well-established both Department of Defense and Air Force guidelines, 
          
 
          technical orders and procedures.  And the fact that this event occurred, 
          
 
          we have determined again that it was an isolated incident to a limited 
          
 
          number of airmen, both at Barksdale Air Force Base and at Minot Air 
          
 
          Force Base.  
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     By saying there was an erosion in the adherence to the rules made 
          
 
          it seem that there was a gradual decline in attention to these 
          
 
          regulations that led to this thing, as opposed to it being sort of a 
          
 
          one-off thing. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  Let me couch it this way as well.  Again, this being an 
          
 
          isolated incident -- but the fact that the lack of attention to detail, 
          
 
          the lack of professionalism, the lack of rigor with applying 
          
 
          well-founded Air Force checklist procedures and not following those 
          
 
          checklist procedures indicate to us from this very thorough and rigorous 
          
 
          investigation that it was a -- certainly a lack of application of those 
          
 
          checklist procedures, again, for this isolated incident at Minot. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Can I ask one (sub ?) question?  The -- but to a layman, the 
          
 
          issue of having nuclear weapons in the same hangar as conventional 
          
 
          weapons seems a bit -- took us, I think -- took me, anyway, a bit aback 
          
 
          that they would even be stored in the same place.  Is that a common 
          
 
          procedure, or are they normally stored in separate places so this kind 
          
 
          of mix-up doesn't happen? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  Where the weapons were stored, they were stored 
          
 
          in the facilities, as I mentioned, and they were stored within DOD guidelines 
          
 
          and Air Force guidelines as well. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     So it is normal procedure, then, to keep nuclear weapons in the 
          
 
          same place as conventional -- 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  These weapons were stored in the proper -- with proper 
          
 
          procedures in the proper locations at the weapons storage area. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Yes, ma'am. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     I have a number of follow-up questions.  First of all, on what 
          
 
          Peter was saying, did you have to get some sort of waiver?  Was a waiver 
          
 
          required to store the warheads and the missiles in the same facility, in 
          
 
          the same hangar? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  The weapons were stored in the facilities per DOD 
          
 
          guidelines and Air Force guidelines as well.  There was -- there was --  
          
 
           
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     (Off mike) -- but does it require a waiver to store them 
          
 
          together? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  The weapons again, as I've mentioned, were stored in the 
          
 
          proper facilities and were within DOD guidelines and Air Force 
          
 
          guidelines as well. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Is there some reason you can't tell me specifically that -- I'm 
          
 
          not understanding, because of my lack of knowledge -- is a waiver 
          
 
          required to do that, or is a waiver not required to do that? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  There was no waiver required in this instance because 
          
 
          they were stored in a facility, in a weapons storage area in this case, 
          
 
          under DOD guidelines and Air Force guidelines. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     So when was it decided that that was an acceptable procedure?  
          
 
          And were the missiles at that point, in that storage at that point in 
          
 
          that hangar -- were they fully fueled?  Were those missiles actually 
          
 
          active missiles? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  These -- to consider them being missiles individually -- 
          
 
          there were actually part of a pylon that was considered to be a package 
          
 
          of six missiles that are attached to one pylon.  And so -- 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Were any of those missiles fueled? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  These missiles were packaged in a way that, again, met 
          
 
          Air Force as well as DOD guidelines.  And so -- 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Were any fueled? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  They were packaged in the manner that is appropriate for 
          
 
          them to be packaged for the mission; in this case, the tactical ferry 
          
 
          operation for them to be transferred from -- 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Was there any fuel in those -- 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  -- they were transferred from, again, from Minot down to 
          
 
          Barksdale.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     (Off mike.)   
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  I'd rather not get into those technical details, but just 
          
 
          to let you know that they were prepared for the tactical ferry 
          
 
          operation, and they were also within the DOD and Air Force guidelines.   
          
 
           
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Can you tell us, to go back to Pauline's question, at what point 
          
 
          in all of this were these warheads in a position that was something less 
          
 
          secure than they would have been if they had been recognized at the time 
          
 
          to be special weapons?   
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  These weapons were never out of the hands of America's 
          
 
          airmen.  They were always secure and they were, again, they were again 
          
 
          under the security and control of airmen at all times.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     (Off mike) -- position of less security than they would have been 
          
 
          had they been understood to be nuclear warheads?   
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  These weapons were always secure at all times.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Yes.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Can you say how many individuals have been disciplined so far?    
          
 
           
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  I referred to it in my earlier remarks, that the 
          
 
          commander at Minot Air Force Base -- the 5th Bomb Wing commander and the 
          
 
          Maintenance Group commander were relieved of command, along with the 2nd 
          
 
          Operations Group commander at Barksdale Air Force Based, were relieved 
          
 
          of command.  And so there are a number of other individuals who have 
          
 
          been relieved of their duties as well, but I'd just like to leave it at 
          
 
          that, if I may.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Is it possible that -- do you foresee criminal prosecutions?   
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  I'd rather not go into any type of Uniform Code of 
          
 
          Military Justice issues.  But as I -- I'll stay in my remarks that the 
          
 
          commander of Air Combat Command, General Corley, has provided convening 
          
 
          authority to the 12th Air Force commander, General Seip.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     And one last question if I might, just as you look back on this 
          
 
          incident, is it safe, again in lay terms, to characterize it as  kind of 
          
 
          a trainwreck in the sense that once the initial error was made of 
          
 
          loading real weapons instead of dummy weapons, the other errors sort of 
          
 
          fell into place behind that?  Is that really what happened here?   
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  How I would characterize it is I would go back to the 
          
 
          point that this is an isolated incident, in the fact that there are a 
          
 
          number of procedural errors that occurred.  There are a number of errors 
          
 
          that occurred by airmen who should have been following DOD and Air Force 
          
 
          guidelines, technical order procedures and policies and so forth.  The 
          
 
          fact that they did not follow these procedures, the fact that they did 
          
 
          not follow these guidelines for technical order -- simple checklist, for 
          
 
          instance, leads us to believe that -- and through this very thorough 
          
 
          investigation, we determined that those policies and those guidelines 
          
 
          and those tech order procedures and checklists remain sound.  It's the 
          
 
          fact that our airmen did not follow those checklist procedures.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Why didn't they follow it?  What have you learned about why they 
          
 
          didn't follow it?  How did this happen, is what I'm asking you.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  It is a -- again, the investigation will lead you to the 
          
 
          point that these airmen again lacked an attention to detail.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      It was a lack of effective supervision, a lack of effective leadership, 
          
 
          and the fact that they were not following nor did they adhere to these 
          
 
          very strict checklist guidelines procedures. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Why were they --  
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     I'm sorry.  Can I just ask you a question?  I don't think we're 
          
 
          getting to the heart of this.  When you asked them, "Why did not you 
          
 
          follow these procedures," what was their answer? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  The reason they didn't follow these procedures, as we've 
          
 
          discovered, is again to their lack of a attention to detail.  It was due 
          
 
          to the fact that they -- for a variety of reasons:  they were passive in 
          
 
          terms of how they should have been following these checklist procedures; 
          
 
          the fact that they did not apply the rigor, the same standards that we 
          
 
          ask of all our airmen to follow through, with certain tech order 
          
 
          procedures and checklists.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      It also goes back to not following a formal scheduling process, 
          
 
          particularly in the weapons storage area. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     I understand that, but my question is, I mean, did you ask them 
          
 
          were they aware of these procedures?  And when you said, "Why did you 
          
 
          not follow them," what was their response? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  Yes.  They were aware of the checklist procedures. They 
          
 
          were aware of the technical order procedures.  We have gone back and 
          
 
          taken a look at how they were trained and also the qualifications. And 
          
 
          so these airmen had been trained.  They had been following at some 
          
 
          period of time in their careers these checklist procedures and tech 
          
 
          order procedures.  And again, through their lack of professionalism and 
          
 
          attention to detail -- and again, leadership and supervision played a 
          
 
          role in this as well. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Yeah? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     But again, did they say, "I was too busy, I had too much work, I 
          
 
          didn't care, I didn't think those procedures were important"? What did 
          
 
          they say? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  They -- again, it was one where they -- based on, again, 
          
 
          their lack of attention to detail in the case of following a variety of 
          
 
          checklist procedures and -- is where the failure occurred. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Did you find substance abuse with any case -- (off mike)? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  The investigation doesn't lead us to any of that -- that 
          
 
          issue at all. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Yes, sir? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     You narrated a series of mistakes by which these various airmen 
          
 
          failed to discover that this one pylon had inappropriate weapons.  Was 
          
 
          there a prior mistake made in preparing this pylon in the first place?  
          
 
          In other words, there were two pylons.  
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  Right. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     One of them had inappropriate weapons.  Through this series of 
          
 
          errors, it wasn't noticed.  But how did that pylon with inappropriate 
          
 
          weapons get placed in there and identified to go on this B-52 in the 
          
 
          first place?  Didn't somebody make a mistake before all this? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  The -- yes.  The root cause of what kicked off this 
          
 
          incident was a breakdown in formal scheduling processes or the lack of 
          
 
          formal scheduling process within the munitions complex.  It became 
          
 
          apparent that the fact that there was no formal scheduling process, the 
          
 
          fact that the day-to-day mission out in the weapons storage area, under 
          
 
          the munitions control, was lackadaisical -- it again lacked the 
          
 
          attention to detail.  It lacked a formal process to the point where it 
          
 
          became an informal process.  And again, this is where the breakdown of 
          
 
          attention to detail, which then led to the procedural errors, had the 
          
 
          event occur. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     But there were two pylons, six missiles each.  Both pylons are 
          
 
          supposed to contain missiles without nuclear -- any nuclear warheads.  
          
 
          One of them contained six missiles with nuclear warheads. How did that 
          
 
          pylon with nuclear warheads get identified in the first place as -- to 
          
 
          be transported from --  
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  In this case, we're talking about the left pylon. The 
          
 
          left pylon -- again, why it arrived in the condition that it was, was -- 
          
 
          it started with that simple breakdown in -- and the lack of a formal 
          
 
          scheduling process within the weapons storage area. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      And then it processes over into airmen who are not doing their job, 
          
 
          following well-established checklist procedures and proper procedures. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Yes.  Yes. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     (Off mike) -- the warheads and -- 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  I'm sorry? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Was some supposed to remove the warheads from those six missiles 
          
 
          and failed to do that? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  Airmen did not do their job following proper procedures 
          
 
          and checklists; that would have prevented this incident from occurring.  
          
 
           
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Is that a yes or -- 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  That's a yes. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     (Laughs.) 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     You mentioned the -- what's happening to the top leaders. Can 
          
 
          you tell us what has happened to the individual -- the airmen involved?  How 
          
 
          many were actually involved in this at both bases?  Are they still being 
          
 
          given -- do they still have these jobs that they did before this nuclear 
          
 
          weapons accident? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  Right now the 5th Bomb Wing is decertified from 
          
 
          conducting its wartime missions.  And so we have gone through -- as I 
          
 
          mentioned in my remarks, we have decertified a number of individuals 
          
 
          from performing their duties day to day, both at Minot Air Force Base 
          
 
          and at Barksdale Air Force Base. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Do you have a breakdown of how many individuals that actually is? 
          
 
           
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  I'd have a rough number for you.  It's several many -- 
          
 
          it's certainly less than a hundred, but that's a ballpark number. And so 
          
 
          -- 
          
 
           
          
 
                      (Cross talk.) 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  I don't have the specific numbers, but it's less than a 
          
 
          hundred. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     (Off mike) -- people that were -- 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Will you take that question, sir? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  Let me do this.  Let me take that question, and we'll get 
          
 
          back to you as soon as we get more of those details. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Go ahead. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     (Off mike) -- what's going to happen -- 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     (Off mike) -- I mean, the Air Force has to know how many. Can you 
          
 
          take that question? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  (Inaudible.) 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     (Off mike) -- as far as the involvement of the DOD Inspector 
          
 
          General's Office -- are they conducting their own separate investigation 
          
 
          of the incident?  And if this was a(n) isolated incident and just kind 
          
 
          of a situation where processes were overlooked, why the blue-ribbon, I 
          
 
          guess, commission or group to relook at the Air Force procedures 
          
 
          overall, if it wasn't a problem of the actual procedures (that ?) took 
          
 
          place? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  I don't have any knowledge of the Department of Defense 
          
 
          inspector general -- whether or not they have kicked off a formal 
          
 
          investigation.  I'm sure we can, you know, talk to DOD or we can perhaps 
          
 
          get back to you on that. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      But I do know that the commander-directed investigation, as 
          
 
          thorough and as rigorous as it was -- it lasted over last [six] weeks.  When I 
          
 
          first met with our chief of staff in the early morning of the 31st of 
          
 
          August and we discussed this, the first thing -- one of the first things 
          
 
          he mentioned was the fact -- the need to do a very thorough 
          
 
          commander-directed investigation led by a two-star general. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Among the many topics we had that morning -- but the second thing he 
          
 
          also mentioned was he wanted a very thorough, broader review of this 
          
 
          incident, and the fact that -- not only a broader review that would go 
          
 
          beyond just Air Combat Command but through the entire United States Air 
          
 
          Force.  And so he also, at that point, wanted an outside look.  And what 
          
 
          we have done as part of our blue-ribbon review that Secretary Wynne 
          
 
          referred to has asked the chief of Naval Operations to provide Navy 
          
 
          personnel to be part of this overarching blue-ribbon review that will 
          
 
          look beyond just Air Combat Command but throughout the entire Air Force. 
          
 
           
          
 
           
          
 
                      And so that's -- that is -- as we look forward, as the commander- 
          
 
          directed investigation report is now complete -- as we look forward, we 
          
 
          will have this blue-ribbon review that will be overarching. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Secretary Wynne mentioned that General Peyer is leading that blue- 
          
 
          ribbon review.  She will report out to our chief of staff by on or about 
          
 
          15 January. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Yes? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     You said three were relieved of duty, but then several more.  Why 
          
 
          the reluctance to give us the total number of how many were relieved of 
          
 
          duty? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  Well, I wanted to underscore the fact that General 
          
 
          Corley, the commander of Air Combat Command, has relieved senior leaders 
          
 
          in this case; as I mentioned, the commander of the 5th Bomb Wing and 5th 
          
 
          Maintenance Group commander at Minot, as the well as the 2nd Operations 
          
 
          Group commander.  I also wanted to underscore the fact that not only is 
          
 
          it with senior leaders; there are other who are involved that are 
          
 
          lieutenant-colonel and below, as I mentioned.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      The other fact is that we are -- General Corley has provided convening 
          
 
          authority for UCMJ actions to 12th Air Force.  And so that aspect of 
          
 
          this incident will then move on into the UCMJ (realm ?). And I'd just 
          
 
          like to leave it at that, please. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     (Off mike.) 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  Three colonels in this case that I mentioned were 
          
 
          relieved of duty.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Yes? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     You said that they were -- the weapons were never left unsecured, 
          
 
          and I -- we understand that there was some level of security at all 
          
 
          times.  But I guess what we need to clarify is, what is the difference 
          
 
          between the level of security within the hangar and outside the hangar 
          
 
          where the B-52s spent the night? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  Having been the commander at Minot Air Force Base, I, you 
          
 
          know, appreciate the fact that it's a very safe, secure environment at 
          
 
          Minot on our flightlines.  These weapons, as I mentioned, were never out 
          
 
          of  the hands of America's airmen, the fact that they were never left 
          
 
          unsecured.  The level of security that they were afforded kept these 
          
 
          weapons safe and secure.  Not up to the standards that we would have 
          
 
          liked, but the fact that these weapons were never out of the hands of 
          
 
          America's airmen and they were secure at all times. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Yes, sir? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Minot's got both cruise missiles with and without warheads. Are 
          
 
          they stored together?  You're talking -- you keep talking about they 
          
 
          came out of the hangar.  Do you store weapons with nuclear warheads in 
          
 
          hangars? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  Our weapons across the Air Force, and specifically at 
          
 
          Minot Air Force Base, are stored within DOD standards and policies and 
          
 
          guidelines.  And so they are safely and securely stored within the -- 
          
 
          and the investigation determined that they were stored within all 
          
 
          applicable DOD guidelines as Air Force guidelines as well. 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     But nuclear weapons storage areas are different from ammo dumps.  
          
 
          Right? 
          
 
           
          
 
                      Yes.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     (Off mike) -- they didn't follow the schedule, the schedule for 
          
 
          what?  The schedule to have the warhead removed or the schedule to be 
          
 
          shipped to Barksdale?   
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  They did not follow the formal scheduling processes that 
          
 
          would allow them to do the proper maintenance and handling of those 
          
 
          weapons, not only in preparation for the ferry flight but also to make 
          
 
          sure that they were the proper and they were the appropriate weapons to 
          
 
          be transferred.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      MR.
          
 
           
          
 
                       :  We have time for one more, please.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     (Off mike.)   
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  They did -- not only was the scheduling process broken 
          
 
          and not followed -- the fact that they did not follow those checklist 
          
 
          guidelines and procedures is -- again this incident occurred because of 
          
 
          the number of those errors.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Last question, I'm sorry.  Go ahead, I'm sorry.  (Cross talk.)   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     Other than removing the nuclear weapons, what needs to be done to 
          
 
          properly prepare one of these pylons for transport?   
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  You go through a number of checklist procedures and -- 
          
 
          which will -- if you follow the checklist procedures, it will lead you 
          
 
          to the point where you will safely transfer these weapons in an 
          
 
          appropriate manner, and the fact that they will be transferred -- again 
          
 
          that they were authorized to be transferred in.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     (Off mike) -- done in hours?  Does it take days to do that?  
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  To process, it goes from weeks to days to hours in this 
          
 
          case.  And those processes broke down.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Sure.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Q     And if I may, if this bomb wing has been decertified from doing 
          
 
          these tactical ferry missions, is there another bomb wing that's doing 
          
 
          them in the interim?  Or have you suspended --  
          
 
           
          
 
                      GEN. NEWTON:  No, all Air Force tactical ferry missions for these 
          
 
          cruise missiles has been suspended.  (Cross talk.)   
          
 
           
          
 
                      So let me -- can I just leave you with this?  This is a serious error 
          
 
          that was caused by a breakdown of procedural discipline by airmen.  
          
 
          We're accountable and we will assure the American people that the Air 
          
 
          Force standards they expect are being met.   
          
 
           
          
 
                      Our wings at Barksdale and Minot are units with a proud heritage. 
          
 
          They've had a history of excellence.  And we've made some tough 
          
 
          decisions but now, we need to restore the confidence in these units and 
          
 
          move ahead.  And I rest assured, we will.  Thank you.
          
 
           
          
 
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