
 
For immediate 
release                                                                                            
13 September 2007
 
THE VIEW FROM AFGHANISTAN:  MAKING 
PROGRESS, 
BUT RE-DEDICATION AND ADDITIONAL RESOURCES 
REQUIRED
 
A delegation composed of six members of 
the Defence and Security Committee (DSC) led by DSC Chairman Julio Miranda Calha 
(Portugal) visited Afghanistan from September 2-7, 2007, and Dushanbe, 
Tajikistan, on September 7-8, 2007.  The group, composed of Members from 
Canada, Estonia, Lithuania, the UK and the US, met with Afghan officials at the 
national and local levels as well as members of the Afghan Parliament, visited 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in different areas of the country, and met with 
the ISAF Commander and a number of his subordinates. 
 
The delegation found that 
visible progress had been made since the Committee’s last visit in May of 
2006.  For instance, Members remarked on the increased economic activity 
visible on the streets of Kabul.  Members were also encouraged by the good 
work they saw performed by the several Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) 
they visited. 
 
Members were especially encouraged by the excellent 
performance of the Alliance’s personnel in Afghanistan, as well as that of our 
partners fighting alongside NATO troops.  Not only was Allied personnel 
doing good work, but it was doing so in a remarkably successful multi-national 
manner.  NATO member states were demonstrating interoperability and 
performing well. 
 
On the other hand, the delegation also came away 
with a strong concern regarding the critical tactical and strategic challenges 
hampering efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan.  The NATO mission 
still suffers from a lack of personnel and assets, the delegation 
assessed.  While NATO forces are able to clear any given area of 
insurgents, they do not have enough personnel to ‘backfill’ and hold a cleared 
area after a successful operation.  Nor are there enough trained and 
capable Afghan National Security Forces to do the job independently.  The 
end result is the re-infiltration of cleared areas by insurgents, and an 
inability by local populations to commit to actively support NATO and the 
central government. 
 
 

 
 
 
The most pressing needs 
include:  additional trainers to quicken the standing up of the Afghan 
National Security Forces; additional theater-appropriate helicopters, an 
absolutely necessity in the rugged terrain and great distances of Afghanistan; 
and additional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, 
critical for knowledge of the battlespace and a tool that contributes to 
minimizing civilian casualties. 
 
National caveats overall had been 
significantly reduced since the Riga summit, and nations with forces in the 
south, where most of the heavy fighting was taking place, did not have 
significant restrictions.  However, General McNeill, COMISAF, called 
remaining caveats ‘vexing,’ stating that they still hampered his ability to 
concentrate military mass when needed, with sufficient speed to make a 
difference.  
 
In the non-operational sphere, governance 
problems continued to plague Afghanistan, a country that has been without 
effective central government for the past 30 years.  This is likely to 
remain a primary obstacle to the reconstruction of the country for the 
foreseeable future.  Corruption, often linked to the surging drug trade, 
crippled efforts at every level of government from, for example, the Ministry of 
the Interior, to provincial governors, judges and police forces.  Without 
dramatic progress in these areas, the vision of a stable and democratic state, 
responsive to the needs of the Afghan people, will remain unattainable. 
 
The delegation concluded that perhaps the central 
political/strategic problem facing NATO in Afghanistan was the absence of a 
well-defined strategic vision for its presence there.  While NATO has 
successfully expanded its presence throughout the country, and while the 
personnel on the ground is performing brilliantly at the tactical level, the 
Alliance simply does not yet have a sufficiently explicit goal for what it wants 
to achieve in collaboration with the Government of Afghanistan.  Without 
such a vision, our forces in Afghanistan will continue to perform their current 
tasks with great success; they may not, however, succeed in creating the 
fundamental conditions of security and stability necessary for the emergence of 
an Afghan political solution. 
 
Fundamentally, the delegation came 
away with a sense that current efforts are making significant incremental 
progress, but not at a rate that will ensure without doubt an acceptable end 
state to our mission there.  NATO must undertake a fundamental examination 
and re-definition of its strategic vision for Afghanistan, and immediately 
provide those resources (both human and financial) necessary to accomplish that 
vision.  
 
The delegation also took advantage of the visit to 
hold meetings with Tajik and Allied officials in Dushanbe, Tajikistan September 
7-8.  NATO is developing a relationship with Tajikistan including 
assistance with border policing at its 1,206 km-long shared border with 
Afghanistan, the site of smuggling of narcotics, small arms, and other 
contraband.  Tajik officials expressed optimism that Afghanistan could 
eventually become a strong commercial partner, principally as a potential 
corridor for the transport of energy resources to Asia and Europe.  The 
delegation also toured the French military presence at Dushanbe, a major hub for 
Allied transport into and out of Afghanistan, as well as the current location of 
French Mirage fighter planes operating in support of international efforts in 
Afghanistan.  The impressive facilities were making an important 
contribution to Allied operations, the delegation 
learned.  
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