PRESS SECRETARY JOHN F. KIRBY: OK. Good afternoon, everybody. And thanks for joining here. Today we've got a special purpose briefing on tap for you. We're here to brief you on the results of the U.S. Africa Command's Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 investigation, and the independent review that Secretary Austin directed of the January 5th, 2020, attack on Cooperative Security Location Manda Bay in Kenya. Secretary Austin's intent for the independent review was to provide added insight, perspective, and the ability to assess the totality of this event involving multiple military services and Department of Defense components. The secretary has accepted the findings and recommendations of the independent review.
Since 2018, U.S. Air Forces Africa have been responsible for the synchronization of base support functions including force protection at Manda Bay. As a result of the findings of the investigation and the independent review, the Air Force took action to address accountability recommendations. I think you have a statement now from the Air Force about those accountability recommendations. And I would direct any of your questions about that directly to the Air Force.
Today, we're going to start with remarks from General Stephen Townsend, Commander of U.S. Africa Command, and General Paul Funk, Commander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, who led the independent review.
We also have Lieutenant General Steven Basham, Deputy Commander of U.S. Air Forces Africa, joining us virtually to brief on the investigation, and in the room, Major General Tom Wilcox (sic) -- Tom, right?
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN T. WILCOX: Yes, sir.
MR. KIRBY: Tom Wilcox from the Independent Review Team, as well as Brigadier General Roy Collins, Director of Air Force Security -- I'm sorry -- Air Force Security Forces.
Finally, one point as we move through the presentation today -- we want to make sure that it's clear how much we appreciate our partnership with Kenya and we'll continue to work closely with them in the fight against Al-Shabaab and other terrorist organizations.
The briefers will take questions at the end of the entire presentation. So we'll get through each presentation, and then when that's all done, I will stay up here and I will moderate the Q&A. I think all told, we've got about an hour to work our way through that, so I won't delay any more. We'll tee up the video of General Townsend.
GENERAL STEPHEN TOWNSEND: Good afternoon. I'm General Steve Townsend, the Commander of U.S. Africa Command, also known as AFRICOM. We're here today to formally brief the results of the investigation I directed into the January 5th, 2020 attack by Al-Shabaab on Cooperative Security Location, or CSL, Manda Bay, Kenya, that claimed the lives of a U.S. soldier and two U.S. contractors and injured two other U.S. service members, a U.S. contractor, and a Kenyan soldier.
We honor the bravery and ultimate sacrifice of U.S. Army Specialist Henry J. Mayfield Jr., Mr. Bruce Triplett, and Mr. Dustin Harrison. They are heroes. It is a solemn duty to provide their families and the American people with answers about what happened that day. There are no words that could take away from their loss.
You will also hear about the results of the Secretary of Defense-directed independent review of our investigation, which was conducted by U.S. Army General Paul Funk.
USAFRICOM took our investigation seriously and it's taken extensive steps since the attack to make CSL Manda Bay and all of our operating locations across Africa more secure. I found the investigation team's work to be comprehensive, credible and thorough.
The independent review conducted by General Funk and his team validated that extensive work. All recommendations from the USAFRICOM investigation have been implemented, some in the hours and days immediately after the attack and others over the following months. We are also well along in implementing the recommendations from the independent review.
At 5:20 a.m. on January 5th, 2020, a ruthless and determined enemy force of approximately 30 to 40 al-Shabaab fighters conducted a complex attack against U.S. forces and assets at Manda Bay, Kenya. In a few short minutes, the attacking enemy inflicted casualties and destroyed seven contracted light aircraft and other property before they were effectively engaged by U.S. and Kenyan forces and forced to withdraw over the loss of at least six enemy killed.
The investigation determined the approximate cause of the loss of lives and materiel was the attack by a mass force of determined, disciplined, and well-resourced al-Shabaab fighters. The investigation also identified four broad factors that contributed to the outcome of the attack and the result of losses.
First, an inadequate focus on potential threats and force protection at multiple levels. For a number of successive years, there was complacent leadership in command and control at the tactical level and poor oversight at the operational level.
Second, there was an inadequate understanding of the true threat to the base at Manda Bay that had been perpetuated by years of local threat assessments. There were also shortcomings identified in the resourcing, sharing and dissemination of intelligence.
Third, there were deficiencies in the organization, preparation and training of security forces, which contributed to inadequate defensive plans.
Fourth, there were problems with mission command, including poor unity of command at the tactical level and flawed staff processes that failed to account for the growth of CSL Manda Bay from a training base to a counter-terrorism support and air base.
As I said in March 2020, we were not as prepared at Manda Bay as we needed to be. Security on a key part of the base proved inadequate with a security force that was insufficiently prepared for their mission.
USAFRICOM has implemented a series of measures to address the shortfalls uncovered during this investigation and the independent review. These include adjustments to training, operations, threat assessments, leadership and force protection practices.
We are grateful to our Kenyan Defense Force partners who responded quickly and bravely to help fight off the terrorists who attacked Magogoni Airfield. The quick thinking, swift action and bravery of U.S. Marines and airmen, first responders, in concert with the Kenyan Armed Forces, was critical to containing and ultimately repelling this attack.
Service in parts of Africa can be challenging, even dangerous at times. The threat from al-Shabaab remains dangerous and real. Al-Shabaab is the largest and most lethal arm of al-Qaeda, an enemy America knows all too well for its ambitions and appetite for destruction.
What we do with our African and international partners to counter violent extremism in Africa is more important than ever. We hold a responsibility to Specialist Mayfield, Mr. Triplett, and Mr. Harrison, to work every day to learn from this tragic event and to keep an attack like this from happening again.
I will personally remember these three brave Americans and their families. We honor their legacies and their sacrifice by faithfully implementing the lessons we have learned from this attack, not only at Manda Bay but across Africa, as we continue the fight they were supporting.
With that, I'll turn it over to the team who will provide you with a more detailed brief and take your questions. Thank you.
GENERAL PAUL FUNK: Good afternoon. I'm General Paul Funk, the Commander of the United States Army's Training and Doctrine Command. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak with you today and I thank you all for being here.
As you've just heard from General Steve Townsend, United States Africa Command conducted an extensive investigation into every aspect of the January 5th, 2020 attack on Cooperative Security Location Manda Bay, Kenya and the resulted deaths of three patriots who were in valiant service to our nation.
On behalf of the entire United States Army, I want to extend our heartfelt condolences to the families of Specialist Henry Mitch Mayfield Jr., Mr. Dustin Harrison, and Mr. Bruce Triplett. These brave Americans will never be forgotten. In fact, we are all here today to ensure we know what went right that day, what went wrong and what we must learn and improve upon to ensure their deaths were not in vain. So let me talk a little bit about the process we use to do just that.
In March of last year, the Secretary of Defense directed the U.S. Army appoint a four-star general to conduct an independent review of the U.S. AFRICOM investigation to ensure the department had a complete look at the causes of the attack. The Secretary of the Army appointed me to execute that review, and I, with the support of our sister services, assembled a panel of 11 senior officers and noncommissioned officers from across the Department of the Defense with experience in deployed environments, command, force protection, training and intelligence. Collectively, the panel had 412 years of military service, over 53 years of combat service and approximately 107 years in command billets. Their expertise and knowledge were critical throughout the review process.
The Secretary of Defense tasked the independent review to assess the entire U.S. AFRICOM investigation, to include if the pre-deployment training and the assignment process for the U.S. persons assigned to Manda Bay were appropriate for the mission. The Secretary of the Army then added additional focus areas by directing the independent review to address whether the actions or inactions of leaders and staff contributed to a poor understanding of the threat and an inadequate force protection posture; whether the findings from the original investigation of no criminal negligence or other misconduct by the U.S. personnel were consistent with the evidence; and whether further investigation was warranted concerning potential organizational and institutional issues.
So we began a thorough review of the complete U.S. AFRICOM investigation. I should note, my independent review benefited from a vast amount of additional information that was not available during the original investigation, such as a U.S. Air Force's Africa investigation that had already begun, documents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Air Force's Office of Special Investigations, as well as multiple responses US AFRICOM provided in response to our queries.
Our review was comprehensive, and I hope that the attention to detail we applied demonstrates to you the importance with which the secretary of defense, the secretary of the army and I addressed this undertaking. We lost three Americans who were willing to serve in an austere and dangerous location. Every member of my dedicated review team was committed to getting this right.
Fundamentally, I found that the U.S. AFRICOM investigation was thorough, detailed and supported by the evidence. I concurred that the proximate cause of the death of three U.S. citizens, injuries to three other U.S. citizens and the loss of U.S. aircraft and property was the attack by a massed force of determined, disciplined and well-resourced al-Shabaab fighters. No single point of failure directly caused the loss of life and damage to the property at Manda Bay.
As General Townsend noted, his investigation identified four causal factors that contributed to the outcome of the attack. I concurred with these causal factors.
Major General Tom Wilcox, a senior member of my review team, will provide additional details about the independent review for you today. Both General Townsend's investigation and my review found that neither criminal negligence nor misconduct by any U.S. personnel was the proximate cause of loss of life or property at Cooperative Security Location, Manda Bay.
But because the charter of the independent review resulted in a more in-depth analysis of individual leader actions, I was able to identify multiple personnel whom I deemed negligent in their actions or inactions, which contributed to creating a vulnerable airfield.
I submitted all of my findings and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, and thanks to the hard work of the panel, I found no further investigation was necessary.
To the families of our fallen, as well as those injured in the attack, I commit to you our full accounting of the event, and I am deeply respectful of your sacrifice.
MR. KIRBY: OK, and with that, we turn it over to Lieutenant General Basham, deputy commander of U.S. Air Forces Africa. He'll be joining us, as you see, virtually to brief you out on the 15-6 investigation.
General Basham, can you hear me? Are you -- or do you have us?
LIEUTENANT GENERAL STEVEN BASHAM: One more time. Can you hear me?
MR. KIRBY: Now we've got you, sir. All good to go. I'm going to -- sir, I'm going to turn it over to you now.
GEN. BASHAM: Thank you. Good afternoon. I'm Lieutenant General Steven Basham, the deputy commander of the United States Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces in Africa. I am speaking to you from Ramstein Air Base, Germany and representing United States Africa Command.
Building upon General Townsend's and General Funk's remarks, I will describe the attack on Manda Bay, the findings of the AFRICOM Army Regulation 15-6 investigation and the corrective action taken by AFRICOM and its subordinate commands. Following my comments, Major General Thomas Wilcox will provide additional insight into the independent review. He will be followed by Brigadier General Roy Collins, who will speak to the U.S. Air Force Security Forces training.
As you heard from General Townsend, on January 5th, 2020 at 5:20 local, a well-prepared team of about 30 to 40 Al-Shabaab fighters conducted a complex attack against secure -- Cooperative Security Location, Manda Bay, Kenya. Cooperative Security Location, or CSL, Manda Bay is comprised of three main parts: the Kenya Naval Base, Manda Bay, which encompasses U.S. Camp Simba as a base within a base, and the nearby Magogoni Airfield, located about one mile south of Camp Simba.
That morning, al-Shabaab members conducted near-simultaneous attacks at both Camp Simba, which is where U.S. forces are housed and most work, and the nearby airfield. Al-Shabaab members initially fired 10 mortar rounds at Camp Simba, which caused only slight damage to the facility and no casualties. It is assessed that the attack on Camp Simba was designed to distract personnel and delay U.S. response to the main attack location of Magogoni Airfield.
At the airfield, while the attack was starting at Camp Simba, two U.S. service members were driving along the runway in a small truck clearing the runway of animals and other hazards to allow a King Air B-350 aircraft to depart safely.
During the routine early morning clearing process, the service-members saw thermal images through a handheld scope, which they initially thought were hyenas. As they approached to better identify the images, they realized too late that they had actually identified a group of al-Shabaab fighters hiding in the vegetation. The al-Shabaab fighters fired two rocket-propelled grenades, or RPGs, at the service-members in the truck. The first RPG penetrated the front windshield but did not explode. And one service-member quickly escaped from the vehicle. The second RPG penetrated the driver side door a moment later. And this device detonated and killed Specialist Henry Mayfield instantly.
Next the fighters engaged the aircraft with RPG and small arms fire as it was beginning its takeoff run. The plane caught fire and the pilots, Mr. Dustin Harrison and Mr. Bruce Triplett were killed. The aircraft came to rest on the side of the runway and it was assessed that the pilots purposely steered the aircraft off the runway to keep it free for future operations. A third contractor who was in the back was able to escape the burning aircraft. The contractor ran to meet up with other maintenance contractors in a nearby hangar and they drove to Camp Simba.
In addition to killing three U.S. personnel, the fighters also destroyed six U.S. aircraft, one Kenyan aircraft, several vehicles, and other property during the first few minutes of the attack. U.S. and Kenyan forces engaged the fighters for several hours until they initially eventually cleared the airfield and the East African Response Force arrived.
Further detail on the attack are included in the redacted AFRICOM Army Regulation 15-6. And I will continue -- I will discuss the findings with you. But before I move to the findings, I want to emphasize the importance and bravery of the Kenyan Defense Force personnel through the events of January 5, 2020. Kenyan forces engaged al-Shabaab both side-by-side with U.S. personnel and independently. A Kenyan helicopter provided close air support to suppress al-Shabaab fighters. And a separate Kenyan helicopter transported a wounded member to a civilian airport for evacuation. Without question, the swift, skillful, and courageous response of the Kenyan Defense Force saved many lives that day. We are grateful for the strong relationship we have with these partners in Kenya, and especially for the bravery and skill they demonstrated that day.
Now to the findings. The AFRICOM investigation found that the proximate cause of death, injury, and property damage was the attack itself by a massed force of determined, disciplined, and well-resourced al-Shabaab fighters. No one act or omission by the U.S. personnel would have avoided the attack. However, the investigation also identified four causal factors which contributed to the outcome of the attack. These findings are binned into four main categories: inadequate force protection focus; inadequate understanding of the threat; inadequate security force preparation; and problems with mission command.
Following the attack, AFRICOM directed subordinate component commands to implement the following corrective actions at all locations on the continent, not just Manda Bay -- prioritize physical defense improvements, conduct more frequent (inaudible) visits and security inspections, enhance intelligence sharing, increase the size of security forces and adapt their focus and capability according to the threat at the location, include defensive plans in pre-deployment training, ensure clear command and control relationships especially regarding force protection, and employ mobile surgical teams.
Specific to Manda Bay, the improvements include clearing vegetation around Magogoni Airfield to improve fields of observation, establish 360 degree defense at the airfield, improving defenses, fighting positions and indirect fire protection at Camp Simba, increasing Kenya participation in security operations, increasing frequency and range of patrols, and improving communications, function and capability at the base defense operations center.
We continue to mourn the losses of Specialist Henry Mitch Mayfield, Mr. Dustin Harrison, and Mr. Bruce Triplett. Their memory remains strong and in the forefront of our minds as we continue to enhance security at Manda Bay and across the continent.
These tragic losses served as a catalyst for significant improvement to force protection, intelligence sharing, security force preparation, and mission command for U.S. forces across Africa. As we counter ongoing threats from violent extremist organizations, these improvements will better protect our service members.
This concludes my remarks. I will now turn the podium over to Major General Wilcox.
GEN. WILCOX: Good afternoon and thank everybody -- thank you for being here today. I'm Major General Tom Wilcox and I was appointed, along with other officers and non-commissioned officers from across the services, to assist General Funk with an independent review of U.S. Africa Command's investigation into the attack at Cooperative Security Location Manda Bay. I appreciate the opportunity to be chosen to assist General Funk in his efforts and to be here today to share with you the key findings and recommendations from his independent review.
I should note that before the independent review was directed, I was appointed to investigate aspects of the attack at Manda Bay by AFRICOM's Air Component Commander. That investigation was stopped when the independent review began but not before I was able to walk the ground at Manda Bay, which definitely helped us during the review.
The independent review first focused on understanding the facts, findings, exhibits and supporting documents included in the original investigation. After exhaustive efforts by the independent review team, we concurred with the investigation on every significant issue.
However, as General Funk explained, we benefitted from a great amount of additional information not available at the time AFRICOM conducted its investigation, and we were able to expand on the four broad categories identified in the original investigation that contributed to the outcome of the attack.
Some highlights include, for force protection, the independent review found that there was an unacceptably long process in time for the planning, approval and execution of force protection projects. The review recommended that more frequent reviews and rehearsals of force protection measures and base defense plans occur and that higher headquarters increase their oversight of force protection issues.
Looking at intelligence, resourcing and structuring, the independent review found that there was not a comprehensive analysis of threat information for Manda Bay and that insufficient resourcing and sharing of intelligence was an issue.
This led to a recommendation that a holistic review of the intelligence architecture be conducted to ensure appropriate intelligence staffing, resourcing and sharing of threat information.
On security forces preparation and training, pre-deployment training, collective training, and overall readiness were found to be insufficient, as was the tactical response of the security forces personnel at Manda Bay, which leads back to some -- into that intelligence piece that I talked about of getting the threat right. The review recommended restructuring pre-deployment training and certification to take advantage of collective training, rehearsals, and an in-theater training.
Then, for mission command, it was found that flawed operational processes and inadequate command and control at the tactical level contributed to the outcome of the attack. Additionally, it was recommended that a single commander be given authority over the joint operating area where Manda Bay was located, to include oversight of force protection, intelligence, training, and other responsibilities.
Beyond the overarching review of the initial inquiry, General Funk was also directed to answer specific questions during the independent review concerning pre-deployment training, the personal -- personnel assignment process, and whether the initial investigation of no negligence or misconduct was appropriate -- it -- whether the initial investigation's finding of no negligence or misconduct was appropriate, both at lower levels and for more senior leaders.
In short, the independent review found that certain personnel at Manda Bay and its higher headquarters were negligent in performing their duties. The review also found that certain senior officers contributed to the inadequate force protection posture at Manda Bay, and to some extent, allowed a climate of complacency and poor understanding of the threat.
In the end, though, while some individuals could and should have done better, the negligence of the individuals identified in the review was not the cause of the losses suffered in the attack, although it may have made the airfield more vulnerable. The independent review also reconfirmed the bravery and heroism of dozens of outstanding service members, civilians and Kenyan forces.
Like others speaking today, I, too, extend my sincere condolences to the families of those Americans who lost their lives in this attack.
We are all encouraged by the improvements that have been made by AFRICOM and the Air Force as a result of this event. Lieutenant General Basham discussed many of those already and I will now be followed by Brigadier General Roy Collins, who will discuss some others. Thank you.
BRIGADIER GENERAL ROY COLLINS: Thank you, sir. Good afternoon. I'm Brigadier General Roy Collins, Air Force Director of Security Forces. The Department of Defense investigation findings from the 5 January 2020 attack at Cooperative Security Location Manda Bay drove the need for enhanced security forces training scenarios and a modification of pre-deployment preparation in order to support U.S. AFRICOM's current force protection threat. Based on the tactical training deficiencies identified in the investigation, our regional training center develop a robust, mission-focused rehearsal training course designed to close the gaps identified with collective training, team cohesion and leadership, core skill training, rehearsals, battle drills and mission preparation. Additionally, the need existed to develop tailored complex attack scenarios informed by real-world threat information to ensure a relevant, hard and realistic training environment existed for our defenders.
Prior to the rehearsal training course completion, aggregated security forces members must complete a culminating capstone field training event to ensure deploying forces are mission-ready. The rehearsal training course greatly exceeds the previous pre-deployment courses, and focuses on providing the base defense mindset and force protection posture needed to operate in a hostile environment, while at the same time, ensuring the highest level of protection for our personnel and our resources, no matter where they are planning.
The updated rehearsal training course was implemented in fall of 2020, and all follow-on forces into the U.S. AFRICOM AOR are now receiving this training. Follow the establishment and the execution of this course, as a member of a joint team, we conducted an on-the-ground assessment of the deployed forces within the U.S. AFRICOM AOR to validate the training met the force protection required standards.
In closing, the response to the findings generated a security forces, enterprise-wide review that ensured pre-deployment training was revamped, collective training was being conducted prior to deployment and in theater and ensured training and preparation is tailored to the deployed locations' threat.
I will now turn the floor over to Lieutenant General Basham.
MR. KIRBY: I think you're on mute there still, General.
GEN. BASHAM: Mr. Kirby, I'm off mute. Can you hear me?
MR. KIRBY: You're good now.
GEN. BASHAM: OK. I'll turn the floor over to you, and then we're prepared to take questions. Thank you.
MR. KIRBY: All right, General. Thank you.
OK, we'll go to questions. Lita?
Q: Hi. I'm not sure exactly who to -- who can swing at this, but I've a couple things. One, you talked about improvements in -- to training, et cetera. I'm wondering, it sounds like that is probably applicable to all forces going to AFRICOM. But was there any effort to consider whether -- whether or not similar deficiencies were in -- at other areas, at other bases that also could benefit from some of the changes that were made here, including staffing shortfalls?
And then secondarily, can you assess the ongoing al-Shabaab threat, and whether sort of overall, has that changed, increased at Manda Bay and/or in that region?
And I have one thing that I don't know that you can address, but on the punishments, I know there's not a lot of detail about the discipline, but can anyone address whether anyone was fired, relieved of duty in any way other -- from their jobs, not removed from service, but anything like that?
MR. KIRBY: Yeah, Lita, let me jump in before the generals on the accountability thing. We would refer you to the Air Force. These were administrative actions that were taken, so it would really be up to the Air Force to be able to decide for themselves how and to what degree they would speak to that. The generals here would not be in position to talk about accountability.
And I will turn it over to any of you who on the -- on her other questions on who might be best for those.
GEN. FUNK: General Collins, I'll offer it to you for the training, and then I'll touch on the Al-Shabaab threat.
GEN. COLLINS: That's a good copy, sir. So ma'am, in relation to the training -- in relation to the training, that impacts all the USAFRICOM theaters. So every security forces member deploying into USAFRICOM is required to - complete a 27 day mission focus readiness training course.
That course focuses on those rehearsal drills, those battle drills, those core skills, and allows them to collectively come together and train as a team so that when they're in the AOR, in the fight, they understand, from a command and control perspective, what should happen, how -- it should happen, in any environment that we put them in, regardless of the size of the threat. So that training was implemented in the fall of 2020 and it is now set in for any forces going into the USAFRICOM AOR.
In relation to how do we do this across a 38,000 personnel enterprise, we've started, you know, with the current 38,000 we have but we also went into our officers course and our accessions course for our enlisted airmen and we embedded base defense as the foundational skill set required for any location that they are assigned to or deployed to, in alignment with the National Defense Strategy.
GEN. BASHAM: ... follow up to the -- "do we consider al-Shabaab to still be a threat," the answer is yes, we would still consider al-Shabaab in this region to be a threat. However, the actions that we have taken, not only at Manda Bay but other locations, to put force protections in place, appropriate training in place, as well as to appropriately equip and provide the oversight, gives us confidence that we still have a -- while we still have a threat in the area, we have a process with force protection in place to be able to protect our military members and to further enable our partners in Kenya, as well as Somalia, in fighting back against al-Shabaab.
Q: As a follow up, General Basham -- I think you touched on this but part of the question was what physical -- were there other sort of security improvements in -- at other bases around Africa resulting from the scrutiny at Manda Bay?
GEN. BASHAM: Great. Thank you for that follow up. The answer is actually yes. I'll start by saying that there was a complete assessment across all installations across AFRICOM and that each installation, based upon its physical capabilities as well as the personnel, it was assessed for increased level of force protection, equipment or personnel.
We certainly have moved out on Manda Bay, in providing force protection measures around the airfield and prudent force protection measures at Camp Simba, but at the same time, each location now goes under an annual assessment, as well as anytime commanders change over, they do a review of the overall integrated defense plan for those installations.
MR. KIRBY: OK. Any other questions here -- elsewhere in the room? OK, we'll go to the phone lines. Jeff Schogol, Task & Purpose?
Q: Thank you. I -- if I heard General Wilcox correctly, he said the review found that some senior commanders may have contributed to the issues leading up to the delinquencies found. Who are these senior commanders and what did or they did not do?
GEN WILCOX: OK, it -- we took a look -- let me walk you back to the 15-6 because -- the 15-6-- I'll kind of explain how these are nested together. The 15-6 -- the original 15-6 by AFRICOM identified folks by name in the report and said "hey, these folks could be found negligent."
The way that process works is a 15-6 typically gets done, the combatant command releases the 15-6 back to the components, and the components work through the accountability and whether the person was negligent. I was actually on that team as part of the Air Force Africa, prior to the Secretary of Defense initiating and ordering the independent review.
So as part of the independent review, we took that and we also looked at -- across the spectrum of everybody that operates in that area, from AFRICOM to the Air Force, Special Operations Forces, the -- the CJ -- Combined Joint Task Force-HOA, and the individuals there at Manda Bay, because General Funk was charged to go take a look at who, by their actions or inactions potentially was negligent.
So we did that and we looked and we found – and we said "senior officers." We didn't say anything about commanders in the statement. General Funk said "senior officers." He found some senior officers at the level above Manda Bay, you know, and recommended negligence on those officers, basically because of the insufficient oversight that they had or provided their inaction on that oversight for force protection, intelligence, et cetera at Manda Bay. And then the remaining folks were obviously, you know, officers, senior NCOs down to enlisted, at Manda Bay that were included in those negligent findings that we turned over to the Secretary, and then -- Mr. Kirby was saying, were turned over to the Air Force.
So I direct you to the Air Force to find out the outcomes of those. But that's basically that process and what we took a look at.
MR. KIRBY: OK. Yeah, go ahead. Please identify yourself.
Q: My name is Roj, I work for Rudaw Media Network. My question is on the attackers. I -- I believe you said six of them were killed and there were about 30. But did the investigation also look at who -- if there was a particular al-Shabaab leader or figure that was behind the attack?
GEN BASHAM: I'll offer that following the attack, there -- there was a process to go through to see if we could find out who was behind the attack. During 2020, there were upwards of 50 attacks on al-Shabaab, and in 2021, upwards of 10 attacks on al-Shabaab.
I can say that, from talking with General Townsend, that we would assess that at least one individual that was connected to Al-Shabaab was in one of those -- one of those attacks, but as far as any additional information or intelligence as to what has been done to locate individuals that were specifically involved and maybe even on the airfield, no additional information at this time.
MR. KIRBY: OK. We'll go to Qasim on the phone there.
Q: Hi, John, thank you. My question is covered. I will defer my chance for the next briefing. Thank you.
MR. KIRBY: All right. No more questions in the room? OK, gentlemen, thank you very much for a-- a really thoughtful and comprehensive presentation. We really appreciate your time. And General Basham, thanks for joining us virtually. Again, we appreciate that.
That's -- this concludes the briefing for today. And again, for any other questions regarding accountability, please refer those to the Air Force. Thank you.
