Keynote Address, Fireside Chat, and Q&A With Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen H. Hicks on the Future Character of War, The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) London, the United Kingdom

Dec. 10, 2024

MATTHEW SAVILL, RUSI DIRECTOR OF MILITARY SCIENCE: Well, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Thank you very much for coming along. It's my great honor and pleasure to welcome you here this morning, to hear from the Honorable Kathleen Hicks, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, who's going to talk about lessons on current conflicts for the future character of war. We're also joined this morning by our incoming Director General, Rachel Ellehuus, who will be chairing the discussion.

I'll introduce both properly shortly, but should start with some ground rules and guidelines for the session. First, we have no fire alarm planned, so in the event of an emergency, please follow RUSI staff who will help you exit the building and flee for your lives. (Laughter.) Secondly, you may post on social media about the event, but now is your opportunity to ensure that your electronic devices are turned to silent and are not going to go off with your witty ringtones halfway through the lecture. Please do not be called out.

Third, in terms of the format of the event today, it will be a talk by the Deputy Secretary, followed by a fireside chat — albeit we don't actually have a fire to be beside — but, that will then be followed by a moderated discussion between Rachel and Dr. Hicks. And then after that concludes, there will be a brief opportunity for audience Q&A, but I do mean brief, so please be concise if we come to you with an opportunity for questions. And finally, and possibly most importantly, in terms of attribution, all three elements — the talk, the discussion, and the Q&A — will be on the record, and are being recorded.

Given world events, we are fortunate to have such a distinguished speaker today, to draw upon her extensive experience. Dr. Kathleen Hicks has spent over 30 years in national security roles, having started her career as a civil servant at the U.S. Department of Defense in 1993 before being appointed to multiple posts, in policy, strategy, and plans, amongst others. In between those roles, she's been a senior fellow and, more recently, a senior vice president at the U.S. Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington D.C., as well as director of their International Security Program. She currently serves as the 35th Deputy Secretary of Defense, and she was sworn into that office on the 9th of February, 2021.

Rachel Ellehuus has just finished being the U.S. Secretary of Defense's representative in Europe and the Defense Advisor for the U.S. Mission to NATO. Before that, she also had an extensive career in the DoD, including actually three years over here in the U.K. in London, assigned to the strategy unit in the U.K.'s Ministry of Defense. And that was — involved working on the Defense Green Paper published at the time, then the 2010 Strategic Defense and Security Review, the SDSR, and the 2012 Defense Engagement Strategy. Her career also included work for leading think tanks such as CSIS — there's a theme here — the Danish Institute of International Affairs in Copenhagen, and the Prague Center of the East-West Institute. She starts officially as our new Director General on the 6th of January, so I'm endeavoring not to get myself fired in advance. (Laughter.)

Now, drawing lessons from contemporary conflict is obviously not a new subject. And indeed, it's essentially the core reason why RUSI was founded in the first place. But recent history has given us a rich seam of operational experience from which to mine, with the caution that we need to be careful about drawing the right lessons from conflict and not focusing on the wrong ones.

A particular hot topic has been the pace of change and some quite harsh headlines for Western militaries on both our readiness and our ability to adapt, particularly in working with industry, the private sector, and society. Dr. Hicks has been prominent in promoting the U.S. Replicator initiative, which is a DoD attempt to accelerate the delivery of innovative capabilities to military forces at a speed and scale that bests existing systems and processes. With the U.K. obviously facing significant challenges in transforming our own armed forces and with the Defense Review obviously underway, there is much to learn.

Dr. Hicks, thank you very much for coming in today, and over to you. (Applause.)

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE KATHLEEN HICKS: Thank you very much, Matthew, and good morning to everyone. It is truly great to be back at the Royal United Services Institute. Across the pond, RUSI is well recognized for its incisive research and broad convening power on defense and security matters.

And as the specter of state-on-state war returned to Europe with a vengeance in February 2022, we've needed RUSI and other independent research centers now more than ever. Notably, RUSI scholars and fellows like Jack Watling, Emily Ferris, Nick Reynolds, Emma Butcher, Noah Sylvia, and more have illuminated many technical, tactical, and operational lessons from Ukraine, the U.K., and other militaries over these past several years.

Every war offers a window into how future wars will be waged. Unquestionably, Russia's war against Ukraine has much to tell us.

For instance, we're seeing novel applications of both old and new technologies, some of which will be significant factors in how wars of the future will likely be fought.

The war has had major consequences not only for Europe, but also other regions — especially the Indo-Pacific, where over the last four years we've sharpened our focus, and strengthened our posture and capabilities, in recognition of a long-term strategic competition with the People's Republic of China.

We've done so recognizing that competition does not mean conflict — because no one should desire the global devastation that such a war would bring.

That's why we seek to prevent conflict, by deterring PRC aggression against the United States and our allies and partners, and by defending our core national security interests. And key to deterrence is being able to win if called to fight.

Of course, there are differences between the regions and their security environments. But there are also similarities, and takeaways that are transferable. We've seen that clearly, and we know our competitors have seen it.

That's why I wanted to come to RUSI today — while I'm in London this week for the biannual U.S.-U.K. Defense Dialogue — to share some of the lessons we're learning in the Pentagon; their implications for the Indo-Pacific, and beyond; how we see the character of warfare changing; and, how we're changing ourselves to shape and master the future character of war.

So, a few quick stipulations up front.

First, to be clear, I'm focused today on changes in war's character, not its nature. I have no need to dispute Clausewitz that war is violent, it is foggy, full of friction, fear, uncertainty, and chance. There has been so much needless bloodshed in Russia's war against Ukraine, and such a high cost paid, especially by the people of Ukraine. That's one reason why war is always the last thing we want.

Second, human beings have a perfectly-imperfect record of predicting the future, let alone the week. So I'm careful here to avoid sweeping statements that leave no room for nuance. Wisdom requires knowing your limitations, after all, and there is irreducible uncertainty in international security affairs.

When future-casting, it's tempting to proclaim a paradigm shift — even though we've all heard those that were premature, or still haven't panned out. It's also tempting to critique heralds of revolution, where evolution seems more evident. I won't give in to either temptation today.

There's a tendency, in our field, to either "fight the last war," or to suffer from "next-war-itis." I have seen the pendulum swing between these mentalities since my first job in the Pentagon over 30 years ago. Instead of picking sides, we must inhabit the tension between them. If we can, success is not guaranteed, but it's more within our grasp. If we can't, failure is all but certain.

That's because technology, warfare, and the operational concepts where they intersect are never static. They are always in motion. And while it can take years or even decades to fully grasp their consequences, it behooves us to discern key themes as soon as we are able. After all, doing so can save lives, secure national interests, and even deter future conflict.

So here are four early insights from the war in Ukraine that I believe have impact for the character of warfare.

The first insight is that quality intelligence is an enduring advantage. Prior to February 24, 2022, few countries expected Russia to further invade Ukraine; we knew otherwise.

Thankfully we saw the enormous build-up of Russian forces early. We had enough confidence in the indications and warnings, and enough credibility, to disseminate the information and rally our friends and allies. Not everyone believed it at first. But those who did were better prepared.

The second insight, which was evident soon after the wider war began, was this: You can have all the elements of an advanced military on paper, but if you can't bring it all together into an integrated system-of-systems, if you don't have consistent operational know-how, winning is tough.

We saw this clearly in Russia's early battlefield failures, and it's still worth noting almost three years later.

It's not as though Russia's military was inexperienced in modern warfare, with operations under their belts from Chechnya, Georgia, Syria, and even Ukraine starting in 2014.

But Ukraine had been working with the United States and other partners like the U.K. since then, training to defend itself. Those efforts paid off early.

It's a reminder of an enduring reality: readiness, training, and operational art — especially on how to aggregate systems in depth across time and space — are often more important for military power than numbers or technology alone. Indeed, a military force can add up to less than the sum of its parts.

Historically, that kind of integration and ability to operate jointly is a relative strength of the U.S. military and our closest allies like the U.K. And we're always getting better, both individually and together, by constantly marrying new operational concepts with game-changing capabilities.

We've of course seen Russia adapt and improve with time, which brings me to a third insight: Protracted warfare is alive and well, even among advanced militaries.

As RUSI scholars noted two years ago, Putin planned to take over Ukraine within 10 days. To date, he's missed his target timeline 100 times over. He underestimated Ukraine's will to fight, and ability to innovate — and frankly, so did many in the west. Even with the best intelligence apparatus in the world, you won't always get everything right.

The clear takeaway is, no one should underestimate the ability of an educated, networked, capable society to self-organize and resist aggression.

Those societal strengths in Ukraine have made their resistance even more challenging for Russia. The Ukrainians are showing how effectively a smaller adversary can tie down a larger one, with the right capabilities and support.

A big reason why is the fourth insight, which is that alliances and partnerships are an asymmetric advantage, especially when the free world comes together: to provide security assistance, such as air defenses, artillery, vehicles, munitions, and more; to impose costs, including with the many economic tools at our disposal; and to defend the rules-based international order that's had so much benefit to so many for so long.

From NATO to AUKUS and beyond, the United States and the U.K. are fortunate to be among dozens of like-minded friends and allies who are partners of choice.

We share values. We train together deeply. We provide each other access, bases, and overflight. Our capabilities are seamlessly interoperable and increasingly interchangeable. Our supply chains strengthen one another.

That's the result of decades — in some cases centuries — of mutual investment in our relationships. We can never take that for granted. And that's particularly true of this special relationship.

Not every country enjoys these advantages. Our competitors undoubtedly wish they did.

Because, long wars are hard to fight without many friends.

And they're even harder to win when you're stuck with bedfellows of last resort.

Whereas genuine, enduring alliances afford a unique sense of resilience.

It's an ad-hoc arsenal of autocracies that has kept Russia in the fight so far. Despite the impact of what Putin cobbled together, a willingness to send parts, weapons, and troops doesn't mean everyone's getting along — although it's still concerning to see. More serious collaboration would be even more concerning.

For our part, we are rebuilding our arsenal of democracies, plural, because our alliances make our industries stronger.

Perversely for Russia, Putin's aggression led to clearer, more public conversations about the transatlantic defense industrial base and the challenges of capability production at scale, enabling us to make necessary investments to get after those challenges, like maximizing production of key munitions — including newer, lower-cost munitions — for a range of warfighting scenarios; investing in our shipbuilding and submarine industrial base, which also matters for AUKUS; using on-shoring and friend-shoring to secure supply chains, from critical minerals to microchips; and, expanding co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment with allies and partners.

We're doing all this because production is deterrence. And while the engines of production never spin up to 100 percent overnight, the war in Ukraine galvanized democratic societies to jump-start their industries and deepen their stockpiles to better deter aggression and prepare for the future.

So what should these insights mean for the Indo-Pacific, and the PRC?

For one, Moscow's early battlefield struggles should be deeply concerning for Beijing. This is especially true because the PLA is far less experienced at modern warfare than the Russian military; the PLA hasn't fought a war in 40 years.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's example of resistance and innovation against an aggressor should also be appreciated clearly — on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, in the South China Sea, and elsewhere.

If the PRC were to pursue aggression against a neighbor, it would likely find what Russia found in Ukraine: that both sides must be prepared for a drawn-out, protracted fight — where the costs for all only go up over time.

And the power of what like-minded friends and allies can do together is also on clear display in the Indo-Pacific, where we've seen what Secretary Austin has called "a new convergence" of our allies and partners around a shared vision of security, from Northeast Asia down to Australia and the Pacific Islands.

Nowhere is that convergence clearer than in AUKUS, where we're working closely with our British and Australian allies: to field algorithms that are already enhancing anti-submarine warfare capabilities; to launch U.K. torpedoes from U.S. platforms, and vice versa; and to advance our capabilities in hypersonics and combined autonomy, among many others.

Again, an instigator of conflict in the Indo-Pacific would find the same outcome Moscow has found in Europe: that military aggression won't achieve your objectives quickly. That you will become increasingly isolated. And that, above and beyond the military consequences, the free world can impose severe economic and reputational costs.

In such a conflict, an aggressor may find that global goodwill evaporates quickly, because most countries don't want to be associated with a nation that bullies or invades its neighbors — no matter how much they've been debt-trapped.

Of course, not every lesson from Ukraine can or should translate to the Indo-Pacific, or elsewhere. There are noteworthy regional differences.

For example, the Indo-Pacific doesn't have a NATO, nor do we seek it to. Instead, there's something even better suited to the region: an organic, broad community of nations that wants the Indo-Pacific to remain free, open, stable, peaceful, and prosperous for everyone. That's what America and our allies and partners want, too.

Another difference: Taiwan is an island 110 miles off the coast of the PRC mainland. In that respect, Russia had it easier — since an amphibious landing is the world's hardest military operation — but still the Kremlin failed to take over Ukraine like they'd planned.

While the PRC claims there are no similarities, we know they're watching this war closely, and taking away lessons — although, observing lessons is very different from implementing lessons. So we will keep a close eye on what they learn. And we'll remain ready to deter aggression.

It's clear why Beijing is watching this war closely: because after almost three years, we have seen the character of warfare change.

At first, emerging capabilities and concepts used in Ukraine — and smaller wars prior — seemed like minor adaptations, enabled by a global diffusion of commercial technology. They've since become more broad-based shifts embedded into the conduct of the war. And these trends will surely echo in future wars for at least the next generation.

One trend is how commercial technology and approaches, with few modifications, are proving useful again and again, from proliferated commercial satellites to small airborne drones to cloud computing. Decades after talk of "network-centric warfare" first appeared, we're watching what happens when it's applied at scale. And we're seeing how dual-use technologies and talent can help deliver it.

Widespread connectivity and widespread electronic warfare have created new opportunities and new challenges for maneuver, dispersal, sensing, and concealment. If you can be seen, you can be hit. That's driving innovation in operational concepts, capabilities, and even force design.

It's also a key factor in our iterative development, deployment, and use of Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control, or CJADC2, which draws upon America's current global lead in software and responsible AI to give us and our allies and partners a clear decision advantage.

Because, when we can see ourselves and potential adversaries clearly — when we make the battlespace more transparent than ever, for us — we can sense, make sense, and act faster, while still maintaining human judgment and responsibility over use of force: the best of both worlds.

Another trend, which some call precise mass, is the use of lower-cost attritable autonomous capabilities alongside more traditional forces to increase the scale and accuracy of surveillance and attacks. The Russia-Ukraine war didn't start this trend, but it did accelerate it. And it's shown how precise mass contributes to magazine depth, which is critical in protraction scenarios.

Today, DoD's Replicator initiative is one way we're embracing precise mass for the future, and putting it into production at speed and scale. Replicator's initial focus is fielding multiple thousands of attritable autonomous systems, in multiple domains, by August of 2025. It's a pathfinder that is not only on track to meet this operational goal, but also to speed the scaling of responsible autonomy more broadly.

And we'll continue to adapt as our competitors and adversaries do the same. That's partly why Replicator's second iteration will scale systems to counter the threat of small airborne drones, in line with our recently-released Strategy for Countering Unmanned Systems.

Precise mass exemplifies a fusion of old and new: throughout history, mass was often decisive in warfare, until Cold War-era tech breakthroughs provided the United States and European allies an opportunity to trade mass for greater precision. Now, the ubiquity of commercially-available precision has made mass matter yet again, even as precision continues to improve military efficacy and efficiency, and contribute to the protection of non-combatants.

The fusion between old and new technology in Ukraine — like small drones enabling real-time artillery correction — also represents a broader trend we're likely to see in future wars.

While each kind of tech has its community of producers and evangelists — like the Bomber and Fighter Mafias of old, each one claiming they matter most — the reality is that both matter: we need uncrewed systems, and 155mm artillery rounds. And both are needed at scale.

Future full-spectrum wars will likely be characterized by high-low mixes of capabilities — some large, expensive, exquisite systems, collaborating with far more systems that are small, smart, cheap, and used en masse. And the important innovations we often see in times of conflict will likely come at the intersection of the two.

The best militaries will master both. And the greatest advantage is likely to accrue to those who are able to combine extant and emerging capabilities to most effectively achieve their operational objectives.

At the same time, the Russia-Ukraine war reaffirms that technology, whether old, new, or both, is seldom itself determinative.

For instance, we've repeatedly seen Russia raining down joint firepower strikes to try to capture Ukrainian territory. That alone didn't get the job done, even when they were expending their best munitions. Remember: they used hypersonic missiles to virtually no strategic effect. Ukraine even took some of the hype out of hypersonics when a Patriot battery intercepted a Russian Kinzhal last year. Make no mistake: taking and holding territory still requires a capable ground force.

To determine which militaries would win a future war, look at the quality of their people, their existing capabilities, and their emerging technologies — and look at how they fuse all three into new ways of fighting, operating, and adopting innovation at speed and scale.

Today, no one does that better than the U.S. military and allies like the U.K. — and we've got the best people doing it, to boot. That will drive and sustain our military edge not just tomorrow, but for years and decades to come.

I'll conclude today with two key tenets for policymakers that I hope we all take away for the long-haul. Both go beyond the character of warfare.

First, while I can't say how the Russia-Ukraine conflict will end, everyone should remember that appeasement only emboldens aggressors.

Those who would say "it's just Crimea," or "it's just the Donbas," should remember those who said almost a century ago, "it's just Austria," and "it's just the Sudetenland." Remember the price paid by so many when Poland came next.

Second is that, as individual democracies and as democratic allies, we have what it takes to outlast and prevail over any who would see our democracies die.

To be sure, that requires the sustained effort of committed citizens, day in and day out, to preserve self-government, to build trust, and to uphold democratic principles and the rule of law.

That is no small thing. And we cannot take it for granted.

The years to come will test our mettle. They will try our souls.

But we need not wither against the howling winds of autocracy that sweep the globe.

We can withstand. We have before.

Remember that the strongest parts of our militaries, our nations, and our alliance do not come from cutting-edge capabilities, the size of our forces, or even the novelty of our technologies and operational concepts. In any long-term strategic competition, those are inherently transient advantages, and they will be contested.

Instead, our most enduring advantages come from fundamentals that no military in a democracy can shape or own alone, because they are the lifeblood of open societies that we defend:

Our economies. Our cultures. Our ideas borne of free minds, free markets, and free people.

Those are our greatest advantages, and a source of tremendous comparative advantage.

As long as they last, so shall we.

Thank you. (Applause.)

RACHEL ELLEHUUS, INCOMING RUSI DIRECTOR GENERAL: Well, that was so much to digest. Very fascinating. Compelling lessons, very insightful. Thank you for taking the time to at least get us on the right track to drawing the right lessons and in particular, drawing those links between what we're learning from the Ukraine conflict to how it could apply in the Indo Pacific. That — that is the right way to look at things in such an interconnected world. But my first question is going to bring us a little closer to home.

You were just here for the biannual defense talks with the U.K., which is in the midst of the Strategic Defense Review. And I'm sure a lot of people in the audience would love to hear from you, you know, what issues or questions would the Department of Defense like to see considered in that SDR? We have such a close relationship in terms of intelligence, the nuclear relationship, operations. Are there certain areas where U.K. investments or focus would particularly help complement what the U.S. is doing?

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HICKS: Absolutely. I do want to first take a moment to say, congratulations —

MS. ELLEHUUS: Oh, thank you.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HICKS: — and thank you to you, for, Rachel, for becoming the next DG here. I think you're going to be an incredible leader for the institution. And to Karin , who has been such an incredible leader here in RUSI for almost the last decade. Just tremendous thanks to you for hosting me.

Yeah, we have, as you know from your time here — as you said, an embed, as was introduced previously, from the Defense Department to the Ministry of Defense here in the U.K. — a very long, deep, enduring, strategic set of relationships and conversations. Our discussions yesterday that I had over at the MoD very much reflected that long history and the frankness, openness and sharing of perspectives. And the SDR presents the newest opportunity, really, to continue that strong tradition.

So some of the issues are what I've just spoken about. They're about how all of our militaries need to be adapting and taking in these lessons of the old and new. Very challenging in the fiscal environment, I think, that the U.K. faces, and so we're of course interested in making sure that there can be a sufficient provision of resources for defense here in the U.K.

But as I know well as the deputy at DoD, it's insufficient to just look at it as a money issue. You also have to look at how you're investing and how effective those capabilities can be. So we certainly value the U.K.'s nuclear deterrent contributions, very much the maritime capability, the ability to be expeditionary, to operate throughout the world.

And then I would say also there's a series of capabilities where we work closely together, where interoperability, and even — as I said in the talk — interchangeability becomes important. So the magazine depth, munitions, areas like that, let alone some of those advanced capabilities where we have to be able to interoperate. And the command and control has to support that.

MS. ELLEHUUS: Thank you. Yeah. That interoperability is a challenge. At my time at NATO, I — we have pages and pages of standards, but we fall a bit short on the implementation. So the attention that you and the deputy put towards improving not just interoperability but interchangeability — sorry, Undersecretary LaPlante put towards improving interchangeability — is really important in this context.

So maybe my second question is in that area, because in your speech you mentioned some great examples of co-production, co-development, working together with our closest and allies and partners, both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific on all phases of production.

Do you see scope for more of that? We've given away a lot to Ukraine and some of those shortfalls in production capacity seem really acute. Is there scope for more cooperation with our European allies and partners and Indo-Pacific allies or partners in that regard?

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HICKS: Surely, yes. I think there are. I think what we have learned is that the idea of looking at this as individual industries, it's not actually been helpful to anyone. So the ability to look at a European and a transatlantic defense industry sector — and to your point, Rachel, to also be thinking about our Indo-Pacific allies and partners who also can bring a lot to the table — and that includes both production, but sustainment.

You know, 70 percent — we talk about this a lot in the U.S. — 70 percent of what we spend on so-called acquisition is actually sustainment. So while we put a lot of energy and time, I think, collectively talking about co-production, which is very important, and co-development, which is very important, a lot of the money is in the back end. So those maintenance facilities, repair facilities, et cetera, I think there's a lot of opportunity there.

AUKUS is an area where we're all engaged, but there are many others. So I think we have taken some good steps forward on co-production, co-development and other opportunities. I think there is a lot of more opportunity out there. I think industry is interested to work with us.

MS. ELLEHUUS: And one, maybe a follow-on to that question, because here and also at NATO, we got a lot of questions — well, you know, you talk about co-sustainment, the U.S., talk about co-development, but are some of our restrictions on export controls or intellectual property? Are they following along as well? Have you made progress in the department and in tearing down some of those perceived obstacles to that cooperation?

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HICKS: We have made progress. Another space, though, where I'd say there's always room for more. So again, with AUKUS, we had some major changes on our ITAR regulations in order to enable the U.K. and Australia to access a wide range of U.S. technologies. We're looking for the same on U.K. side and the Australian side, and of course the U.K. has made some changes there as well, so it's a mutual issue.

On IP, I think that's a big issue with industry in particular, more so than country-to-country. So making sure that we have, as governments, ways to secure our rights on IP to make sure we can operate in the future. Again, to access all of this AI capacity out there and data capacity out there, we need to be able to software upgrade quickly. We need the IP rights to be able to do that. That's a big area of focus for us, but I do think there's more room. And the National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan, just gave a speech last week on this topic and indicated there that the U.S. is also looking at MTCR, Missile Technology Control Regime, shifts that could allow for more sharing as well.

MS. ELLEHUUS: Excellent. It seems like the right trajectory. I want to open it to audience Q&A in a moment, but maybe I can just sneak one more in myself.

Going back to the Ukraine war, we talked a lot about — and in your speech you highlighted this — the importance of combining mass and industrial capacity with ingenuity and innovation. But you didn't really touch on how Putin has used the threat of use of nuclear weapons as a way to affect our decision-making.

Could you maybe say a little bit about what lessons or insight we can take from how the West has handled and managed through those nuclear threats? Because they are very concerning.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HICKS: They are very concerning. They've been irresponsible. We have approached this matter, I think, very soberly. We have taken a very strategic look at our approach. And we have really looked at the integrated — what we call integrated deterrence approach, looking beyond just nuclear on our side, if you will, to the full suite of everything from economic and diplomatic, but even within the Department of Defense, you know, our capability suite well beyond nuclear.

I think the key takeaway for Putin should be that just because you possess nuclear weapons doesn't mean you are not subject to the Charter — U.N. Charter — and you don't have a free pass. And I think that's what the free world has been able to demonstrate.

But I think that's as much as I'll say on that topic.

MS. ELLEHUUS: Excellent. Thank you. So if I turn to audience Q&A, what I'd like to do — because I see a lot of hands going up and we have limited time — is I'll group them in threes and then turn to the Deputy to answer. Remember that we're on the record and when you give me your question, please introduce yourself before presenting your question. So let's start in the front row. (Inaudible).

Q: (Inaudible) Syria, what's the plan to maintain the security of the (Inaudible) and what's the plan to (Inaudible) compromised and (Inaudible)?

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HICKS: You're going to group. Sorry.

MS. ELLEHUUS: I'll group, just to give you some space to think about things as well, if that's O.K. Also in the front row.

Q: (Inaudible) and I'm just wondering, just following off (Inaudible) question. (Inaudible) bring back (Inaudible) from Syria? And also secondly, would you consider the (Inaudible) too small (Inaudible)?

MS. ELLEHUUS: O.K. All right. Maybe we'll stop there because that was kind of three questions. Two on Syria and then one on the specifics of U.K. defense.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HICKS: Sure. On Syria, obviously, a very rapidly evolving situation there. Our primary mission in Syria, before these last few week's events, was countering ISIS. That continues to be our focus. And you will have seen, of course, a strike that we took just over the weekend in furtherance of that.

So that's — we're focused on protecting our forces that are there doing the counter-ISIS mission. We're focused on executing that counter-ISIS mission, and making clear that it is not acceptable for ISIS or elements akin to it to be part of the solution set there.

In Syria, the President has already come out to say that there's a lot of opportunity and hope we have for Syria. And I would emphasize that, but that hope comes with a lot of need for moving on to governance in Syria, and so we're going to be watching that. There is no pressure underway with regard to camps or prisons, if that's the question, that I am tracking.

MS. ELLEHUUS: And on the U.K.?

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HICKS: Yeah. This the problem.

MS. ELLEHUUS: Sorry.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HICKS: Apologies. I don't remember. What was the other one? I'm sorry.

MS. ELLEHUUS: It was — do you want to repeat?

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HICKS: Oh, the size of the U.K. military. Here's what I would say. In our own system, we work through all the time the tradeoffs that you have to make between — generally speaking — how ready your force is, the size of your force, and how much you're investing for the future.

And I think it's important to carefully balance all of those things. So I'm not going to comment on the size of the military for the U.K., but only to say that I think this review offers an opportunity — probably, as it does for us when we go through these reviews — to look afresh at the balancing of those three attributes: you're ready, you're investing for the future, and you're sized appropriately for contingencies that could arise today.

MS. ELLEHUUS: That's a very helpful construct. O.K. So we'll go front row, back row, front row.

Q: Thank you. Deborah Haynes from Sky News. Sorry, got a quirk in my voice. Can you give your assessment of what it means for Russia's limitations that it completely failed to prop up again the Assad regime? And what is your assessment of its military bases there? How big a blow is this for Russia?

MS. ELLEHUUS: The gentleman with the glasses.

Q: Hi, I'm Nikita (Inaudible) TASS. My question is about Ukraine and precisely about Russian launch of its new missiles Oreshnik in Ukraine, and has Pentagon conducted an assessment of this launch? And when will the United States be able to develop its own capabilities of its kind? Thank you.

MS. ELLEHUUS: Jonathan?

Q: Thank you so much. Jonathan (Inaudible) from here, from the Institute. Can I take you to the other side of the world and to AUKUS? How much is this arrangement sui generis for the three countries? And how much could other nations plug into it? And connected to that, is there a consensus in Washington on AUKUS, or do you see your opinions changing with a new administration?

MS. ELLEHUUS: O.K.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HICKS: You wrote it all down.

MS. ELLEHUUS: So the first two questions were related to Russia —

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HICKS: Yes. Yeah.

MS. ELLEHUUS: — one about Russia's limits, I guess to foreign policy and operations given what happened in Syria, and then some specific questions about the missile launch.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HICKS: Sure. So going backwards, maybe. I'd say the same thing I said on the hypersonic use early on. They have new capabilities were used. We take note of that. We assess that going forward. Don't see a significant effect strategically or operationally on the war with that use.

I do think this, the collapse of the Assad regime is a blow to Russia in the Middle East. I think time will be able to help us understand the connectivity of all these various trends, but there's no doubt that during the course of the Biden administration, both the Iranian axis of resistance, and Russia's failed attempt to overtake Ukraine, and now Syria, are indications of weakness there. I think the Hezbollah ceasefire provides a sign of how one can come out of this into, perhaps, a more stable approach and I'm hopeful that we can see more of those sort of peaceful ways forward.

MS. ELLEHUUS: Excellent. And Jonathan's question was about AUKUS, and how some of the work that you're doing in the defense industrial space could possibly translate in the European context.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HICKS: Well, first of all on AUKUS, I think part of the question too is about the sustainability of AUKUS and then growing the community of AUKUS. So I think there's absolutely opportunity both to sustain it and to grow it. I do think the focus is, for both pillars, making sure that the three founding members here are able to advance the capabilities, both the submarine capability and of course the advanced technology capabilities — but advanced technology capabilities applied against key operational problems. These aren't fantastical issues. These are real world problems that we're working against. And then I think there is room to build on that, or to build like — in addition, to build on that — to build like constructs, to your point about Europe.

The sustainability, look, I think Secretary Austin just was asked this last week, and I'll repeat what he said, which is it's to the strategic advantage of all partners and that includes the United States. I think it's been incredibly helpful to galvanize both what we can do on the innovation front and to strengthen the deterrent in the Indo-Pacific. That leads to stability in the Indo-Pacific. What we want is not war. What we want is the PRC to wake up every day, and any other aggressor, and say, "today is not the day, there's enough deterrent out there, it's not worth the cost," and I think AUKUS advances that.

MS. ELLEHUUS: I think that's an excellent note to end on, once again, going back to the ties between the two theaters. And I want to take an opportunity to thank you for all the work you've done to lay solid foundations in the department —

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HICKS: Thank you.

MS. ELLEHUUS: — whether it's the people in the department who really make the policy and carry things forward, or really setting us on a nice trajectory in terms of innovation, operations, and whatnot. So thank you so much —

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HICKS: Thank you.

MS. ELLEHUUS: — and good luck with whatever is next. (Applause.)

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HICKS: Thank you very much.