Well, Mr. Secretary General, thank you for your leadership throughout, and for this forum. And as I said, my first NATO Defense Ministerial last February, and as the Trump administration has said again and again in the last year and a half, our allies must step up. President Trump has been very clear on this point for many years, and over two administrations, and for too long, NATO has been a paper tiger and a one-way street. No more, and that's what the Hague Summit is all about.
That's what defense spending commitments are all about, transforming NATO back into a real military alliance that's focused on hard power and real deterrence, a NATO 3.0 modeled on the NATO 1.0 that won the Cold War, with our allies actually taking the lead in Europe's conventional defense, and that's what NATO was always supposed to be, and what its framers, like President Eisenhower, always expected. Europe was not supposed to be a dependency of the United States. That's not what Winston Churchill or Charles de Gaulle or Konrad Adenauer wanted or expected. No, Europe was supposed to be a military power allied with a strong America.
This is the essence of NATO 1.0 as Dwight Eisenhower himself said, as early as 1951 if in 10 years all American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes have not been returned to the United States, then this whole process will have failed. Eisenhower was Supreme Allied Commander then, not yet our nation's 34th president, but he and his allied counterparts, all of them still living in the shadow of World War Two, understood that NATO's power did not come from committees or from meetings or from small flags on fancy tables, it came from warriors, and for Europe's defense, it had come from NATO allies. That was NATO 1.0, a hard-edged war fighting organization, folk to focused on Europe's defense, but that spirit faded after the Cold War ended.
No longer focused on defending Europe. NATO 2.0 drifted toward out-of-area operations and things that had nothing to do with war fighting at all. Instead of tanks and fighters and air defenses, the focus had been on gender equity and climate change and defense austerity. Europe's borders flew wide open, welfare states expanded, defense budgets cratered, along with Europe's belief in itself and its civilization. NATO lost its way. NATO 2.0 was an era of distraction, deindustrialization, and demilitarization. It was an era of free riding and those were lost years that we're not going back to.
And that's why at the Department of War we've been so clear and so candid to restore NATO's core military role and character, and that's why we've returned US troop levels in Europe to pre-2022 levels with the redeployment of a brigade combat team last year and further reduction of 5,000 forces earlier this year. At the same time, it's why we've engaged with our allies so consistently, and it's why we've grown our own defense industrial base and encouraged to turn NATO 3.0 into reality, to return the alliance to its roots as a military alliance, and ensure that it has the European strength required to sustainably deter aggression, and if need be, make good on Article Five.
Some of our allies have gotten the message and stepped up, you know who you are, and we very much appreciate it. Last year, under President Trump's leadership, NATO set the new global standard for allied defense spending, 5% of GDP all in on defense. It's historic and it's transformational, and some allies are already well on their way to meeting this ambitious target, and in some cases ahead of schedule. And as you've seen over the last six months, President Trump is also committed to the United States defense spending more than $1 trillion in 2026 and a commitment of 1.5 trillion in 2027. We will lead and exceed our own NATO spending standards, and I'm personally on Capitol Hill in order to make sure we do it. It's not do as I say, it's do as we do.
Some allies are also getting serious about how they're spending on their defense, in May, the Department of War told allies that we're reducing our contributions to the NATO force model. We also explained how allies can and should backfill those changes. General Grynkewich reports that some allies have stepped up accordingly, and it's a good start. At the same time, just last month, a small group of strong allies gathered at Bergen for a conversation about focused allied defense spending on the capabilities required to defend Europe, even in the event of simultaneous conflicts worldwide. Again, more serious progress on Ukraine as well, progress through President Trump's PURL Initiative, allies have taken the lead in funding support for Ukraine's defense. Ukrainians are holding their lines even in the face of sustained Russian assaults. We said it could be done, that our allies could lead, and that it would be consistent with Ukraine's defense. It is happening, and it's a validation of President Trump's approach, an approach that will set the table for peace.
Yet, for all these early steps in the right direction, there have also been real setbacks that we cannot ignore. For all of our clarity, too many allied capitals seem to still miss something in translation. Too many allies still don't recognize the historic need that President Trump has made clear to them and to NATO itself to reforge a relevant, powerful military alliance.
As President Trump put it, and rightfully so, he gave our allies attest to support America when we asked for their help, and too many failed it. The United States has defended Europe for generations, and the President all he said was that our jets would need to take off from bases in Europe or our ships from ports to strike targets in the Middle East, Iranian targets that threaten European interests even more directly than they threaten us, but too many of our allies said no, or tried to drown us in arcane legal debates, or criticized us publicly for doing what they aren't prepared or able to do themselves. It was shameful.
These allies, they put America's sons and daughters, our sons and daughters, at risk by denying them the predictable access facing an overflight that never should have been in question at all. In some cases, we had to shift capabilities from one country to another out of NATO allied countries altogether. There's no excuse for that, and that's not to mention the fact that some countries have yet to show a credible path to meeting their Hague commitments. Too much talk, some of NATO's largest economies, some of the richest countries, allies that are happiest to go on about the rules-based international order and middle powers banding together, still seem to think the era of free riding is here. Eisenhower and Trump disagree. This isn't what the president or America expects from this alliance. This is not what any reasonable person would expect, and it's not going to cut it anymore.
And so, we're doubling down on our effort to make NATO what it always was supposed to be, a balanced alliance with Europe in the lead for its own defense, NATO 3.0 and to make that a reality. I'm announcing today a six-month Department of War review that will examine America's force posture and basing in Europe. Up to six months could be less. Let's call it the NATO 3.0 review. This review will be conducted with the benefit of inputs from the United States military, from European command, it will involve consultations with the U. S. Congress and with our allies but make no mistake about it. This will be a real review. It will be designed to ensure that NATO is moving fast and irreversibly toward Europe leading, stepping up to take primary responsibility for the defense of Europe, stepping up to ensure our forces are postured for America's global needs, and stepping up to make sure that our access, basing, and overflight are clearly delineated and assured any other country would do the same at the same time.
Going forward, our annual NATO dues will be contingent on other countries meeting their defense spending targets. Where other allies do not spend with urgency, our dues contributions will go down. NATO will be a two-way street. It's only common sense. America cannot care for or pay more for Europe's defense than our allies do. And this review will think outside the box. Our national defense strategy states clearly that we're going to incentivize and enable our allies to step up and do their part, so we're going to keep a close ally, close eye on allies who are not doing that, and who say no, or maybe, or wait and see when it matters most. It's a review that some countries will fail, and others will pass with flying colors. In the end, the review is intended to both improve U.S. force posture and basing and strengthen NATO 3.0. It's intended to be constructive, as we have always been. There are no strategic surprises here. There haven't been. I've been clear with all of you since my first remarks to this body in February of 2025 President Trump has always done the same.
Our direction of travel is and has been clear. This is the right thing to do by the American people. It's the right thing to do by this alliance. Europe can and must take primary responsibility for its conventional defense as it pledged at the Hague Summit, and in the process safeguarding Europe's defense for generations to come. We know our allies can do it, and it's time. Thank you.
